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ABSTRACT 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are currently prominent constructs for 
stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs are composed of civil-
military teams, including elements from coalition partners and the host-nation, and 
involve multiple military services and civilian agencies. Their missions are to extend the 
legitimacy of the central government throughout the country and to use Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) to counter anti-government forces.  
PRTs are prominent, but controversial.  Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
complain that the U.S. military blurs the lines between humanitarian assistance and 
military operations.  Other critics have called PRTs interagency failures because the U.S. 
Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and other government 
agencies have not contributed the personnel, resources, or training required to make PRTs 
operationally functional.  The result is both lack of integration and of effectiveness. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how to make PRTs more effective in the 
future.  While host-nation participation is necessary for success, this thesis will focus 
only on the controversies involving NGOs and interagency communities. These include 
humanitarian space, general attributes, and effectiveness of PRTs. 
The policy prescription for future PRTs is found in the concept of a Civil Military 
Operations Center (CMOC), which is described in U.S. Army’s FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs 
Operations.  The core tasks of a CMOC, especially those of Civil Information 
Management (CIM), are designed to accomplish a variety of missions relating to Post-
Conflict Reconstruction (PCR). They would serve well as foundational components of a 
PRT.  Also, because of the interagency nature of PRTs, commanders of these teams must 
have the right character and skill sets to operate in this complex environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RELEVANCE 
The United States is many years into what U.S. policy-makers call a Global War 
on Terrorism (or the Long War).  Due to the asymmetric nature of the threat, the U.S. 
military is actively looking for alternatives to its conventional approach, known as direct 
action.  U.S. policy has, in effect, endorsed nation building through regime change and 
reconstruction.1 This strategy addresses population grievances in the area of concern, so 
that publics will no longer harbor, or be susceptible to, insurgents and terrorists.   
The U.S. and the Afghan governments used a Civil Military Operations (CMO) 
strategy in the fall of 2002 by establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 
composed of Afghani (or host- nation), coalition, joint (multiple service), civilian, and 
military elements.  The mission of the PRTs was to extend central government authority 
into the rural areas and to use non-lethal measures to counter anti-government forces.  
PRTs were meant to do two things: first, to integrate military and traditional aid programs 
toward common goals; and, second, to decentralize Stabilization and Reconstruction 
(S&R) tasks by having the local population participate in determining projects and by 
building local and provincial governance capacity.  This thesis focuses on the former. 
PRTs are controversial. As you will read in this thesis, one criticism concerns 
roles. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complain that PRTs blur the lines 
between humanitarian assistance and military operations. A second criticism relates to 
effectiveness.  Some critics have called PRTs an interagency failure because the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and other government agencies (OGA), have not 
contributed the personnel, resources, or training required to make PRTs operationally 
functional.   
                                                 
1 Three national security documents describe the new strategy: National Security Strategies of the 
United States of America (Washington, DC: National Security Council, March 2006), 5-7; National 
Strategies for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Security Council, September 2006), 9-11 
& 16; National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington, DC: National Security Council, November 2005); 




This paper will review these criticisms through a survey of the literature and 
selected interviews with 15 military and civilian personnel who were involved with the 
planning, establishment, or participated in the first PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The 
first set of issues revolves around a concept called “humanitarian space.”  This term 
refers to “the access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to access and meet 
humanitarian needs.”2  IOs/ NGOs are deeply concerned by the rise of humanitarian aid 
activity being conducted by PRTs because they see them as violating this sensitive 
principal.  My research finds that this issue will be difficult to reconcile.  Military 
personnel must clearly convey that they are not trying to take aid workers’ jobs and they 
must never try to pass themselves off as NGOs.  The military must ensure that military - 
led PRTs are temporary and they will transition to civilian led organizations when the 
security environment permits.  As much as possible, the military must be transparent 
about its activities so that the local population will not be confused about the difference 
between an NGO and the military.  However, the military has legitimate reasons to 
conduct humanitarian activities, particularly in counterinsurgency operations (COIN). 
The practical criticism primarily centers on the operations and the effectiveness of 
PRTs.  My research shows that their operational dysfunction and ineffectiveness is 
largely due to the ad hoc nature of the planning and establishment of PRTs.  The first 
PRTs in Afghanistan had high personnel shortages and the people who did show up were 
not qualified for their jobs.  PRTs had to borrow equipment that was old and barely 
workable from other units.  The military and civilian personnel did not collectively train 
together before they arrived at a PRT. Cultures clashed as they determined who was in 
charge.  When operational planners created these ad hoc organizations in war zones, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Force Management system, which had to fill them, had a 
difficult time supporting them due to the peculiarities of a 5-year budget cycle. While 
DoD Force Management may have been able to meet limited equipment needs 
immediately, it needed months, if not years, to budget and build a training program or a 
                                                 
2 European Commission’s Directorate for Humanitarian Aid. 
 3
personnel pipeline to meet the right skill sets needed for the PRTs.  When the first PRTs 
stood up in 2003, DoD had to wait until 2004 to budget them.   
The policy prescription for future PRTs is to resolve the challenges presented by 
ad hoc units in advance. Future PRTs must be represented in future budgets.  DoD and 
the other government agencies need standing capabilities that can easily be joined into a 
PRT on a moments notice.  I will argue that the U.S. military has done some of this by 
transforming the U.S. Army Civil Affairs forces in 2005. The Army rewrote its doctrine 
(Field Manual or FM 3-05.40) and transformed the Civil Military Operations Center 
(CMOC) - for years the CMOC had been an ad hoc organization - into a standing 
capability.  This paper will demonstrate that the CMOC has the same capabilities as a 
PRT with the exception of the civilian personnel.  The core tasks of the new standing 
CMOC, especially Civil Information Management (CIM), are designed to accomplish 
most- if not all- of the PRT’s missions.3  The CMOC can easily accommodate civilian 
members.  If the CMOC should become the foundation of future PRTs, it will resolve 
various issues that plagued the first group of PRTs.   
While the Army has gone a long way to resolve the ad hoc problem for the 
military, the problem may never be resolved in the civilian sector.  U.S. government 
agency culture, and the budget process, may not be amendable to the needed reforms.  
However, the State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction may help minimize the turbulence of “adhocracy” by identifying civilian 
personnel for PRT duty in advance and ensuring civilian personnel annually train with 
the military in exercises and training events.   
Finally, the interagency nature of PRTs requires future commanders to have the 
skill sets of a Civil Affairs officer and a profile of the “boundary spanner.” A boundary 
spanner is a business term for individuals who can work in an environment where there is 
no hierarchy or multiple “chain of commands.”  With the standing capability of a CMOC, 
intensive and collective interagency training, and the right leader, the operational 
difficulties experienced by PRTs can be vastly minimized or eliminated. 
                                                 
3 Standing capability is being defined as a permanent structure that is part of an Army Table and 
Organization (TOE) and Program Objective Memorandum (POM). 
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C. OUTLINE 
This thesis is broken down into three chapters.  Chapter II describes the history of 
PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq and how the environment determined the different 
missions of PRTs in them.  Chapter III discusses the successes and controversies 
surrounding the PRTs as far as the international and interagency community are 
concerned, and discuss the practical issues of PRT operations.  Chapter IV explores ways 
to improve the effectiveness of PRTs by looking at the new standing capability of a Civil 
Military Operations Center (CMOC).  It examines how to minimize interagency 
adhocracy and determine the right profile and skill sets of a PRT commander. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 
TEAMS  
This chapter describes the history of development of PRTs in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  The history reveals difficulties establishing these organizations, why ISAF 
became enthusiastic about PRTs after some reluctance, and how PRTs came to Iraq.  In 
each country PRTs replaced similar organizations, such as the Combined Joint Civil 
Military Operations Center Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Afghanistan and the Governorate 
Support Teams (GST) in Iraq.  These previous organizations, especially in Afghanistan, 
were party to controversies in the humanitarian community. 
A. COALITION JOINT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE  
The military involvement in stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan 
originated in the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) in 2001-2002.  These 
were first established in Islamabad and Karshi-Khanabad (K2), an Air Force Base located 
in Uzbekistan near the Afghan border.  The Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell in 
Islamabad was designed as a coordination cell that interfaced with the headquarters of 
both the international organizations (IOs) and NGOs.4  The Coalition Humanitarian 
Liaison Cell in Karshi-Khanabad worked with the local population near the Air Force 
Base and, later was turned into a CMOC that helped push Coalition Humanitarian Liaison 
Cell Teams into Afghanistan.5  The missions of the first Coalition Humanitarian Liaison 
Cells in Afghanistan supported counterinsurgency operations being conducted by Task 
                                                 
4 The CHLC in Islamabad was established in October 2001 and later moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, in 
December 2001. I was in Islamabad when the CHLC left for Kabul as part of BG John H. Kern’s fact 
finding mission on behalf of Central Command.  The Islamabad CHLC would later be downsized but 
remained open as long as the UN and other NGOs still kept a significant presence in the Pakistani capital.  
Long before the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, the UN had its Afghan headquarters and other agencies such as 
UNHCR and WFP in Islamabad.  A few international NGOs, also, had their headquarters located in 
Islamabad as well.  
5 K2 became the first U.S. forward military base for coalition forces.  It was the main hub until 
Bagram Air Base located 50 miles from Kabul, replaced it in December 2001.  K2 still remained active as a 
support base for Afghan operations before it was shut down in November 2005.  
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Force Mountain and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) and 
were co-located with Special Forces teams throughout the country.6   
Concurrently, in the fall of 2001, Central Command (CENTCOM), through Army 
Central (ARCENT or 3rd Army), began planning for the establishment of a CJCMOTF to 
become the central hub for all military humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 
activity when Afghanistan was declared to be in a PCR environment or what the Army 
was calling Phase IV of operations.7  The CJCMOTF was designed around logistic 
capabilities to directly build projects, in contrast to a traditional Civil Affairs mission, 
which would be to facilitate the work of others — primarily IOs/NGOs – to rebuild the 
country.8  Consequently, the IOs/ NGO community accused the CJCMOTF of 
duplicating humanitarian assistance efforts that were already being done by them. 
In January 2002, the CJCMOTF deployed to Afghanistan and all existing 
coalition humanitarian liaison cells in the country were placed under its command.9  
While the JCMOTF answered to the Coalition Forces Land Component Command 
(CFLCC) Commander at Bagram, its activities were independent of the missions being 
conducted by the JSOTF and the maneuver brigade located at Kandahar airport.10  The 
lack of integration and coordination between the activities of the CJCOMTF with the rest 
of the military began to generate criticism by some military commanders and staffers that 
                                                 
6 Subsequent CHLCs were set up in other Afghan cities and towns like Masar-E-Shariff, Kandahar, 
Konduz, Heart, and Bamyan.  Active duty Civil Affairs personnel from the 96th Civil Affairs (CA) 
Battalion (Airborne) out of Fort Bragg, NC manned these CHLCs.   
7 Phase IV was post-hostilities according to CENTCOM planning staff, meaning major combat 
operations had ended.  However, the decision point was political and Phase IV was not declared in 
Afghanistan until long after the JCMOTF was established. 
8 The CJCMOTF was built with troops and assets from the 377th Theater Support Command, an Army 
Reserve unit from New Orleans, LA; and 122nd Rear Operations Center (ROC), a Georgia National Guard 
unit.  The 489th CA Battalion (BN) from Nashville, TN, filled out the remaining headquarters.  Follow on 
CJCMOTF rotations would become more CA centric.  The 360th CA Brigade from Columbia, South 
Carolina would replace the 377th TSC and 122nd ROC. 
9 The 489th CA BN replaced all of the CHLCs in passive areas.  The 96th CA BN still manned CHLCs 
that were still considered in combat zones, such as Gardez, Khost, and Ghazni. 
10 While CFLCC and the 10th Mountain Division had their headquarters in Bagram, the coalition 
ground maneuver unit ran operations out of Kandahar airport.  This Brigade also had its own Civil Affairs 
Teams that conducted their own HA projects independent of the CJCMOTF. 
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the CJCMOTF was just another NGO without accountability.11  These critics, and even 
some members of the Civil Affairs community, would later refer to the activities as 
“NGO R Us.”   
Military personnel were not the only ones grumbling about the CJCMOTF.  A 
few IO/NGO workers complained that CJCMOTF personnel were hard to distinguish 
from them because they wore civilian clothes, drove in unmarked vehicles, and put up 
signs that looked similar to their organizations.12  Thus began the debate of 
“humanitarian space.”13   
The CJCMOTF had a few successes.  For example, it was able to “break the 
code” on how to access humanitarian assistance funds called Overseas, Humanitarian, 
Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDCA).14  With these funds, the CJCMOTF, through the 
Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells, was able to build projects quickly ranging from 
wells to schools to repaving debilitated roads.  Prior to Afghanistan, the OHDACA 
process for funding was slow and hierarchical with every project having to be approved 
by Central Command.  During the conflict, the approval process was delegated to the 
CFLCC commander and later to the CJTF Commander at Bagram.15   USAID was able to 
                                                 
11 When I was working for the Office of Military Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in the 
summer of 2002, the former CJCMOTF officer told me a Special Forces Colonel complained to him that 
the CJCMOTF was a renegade organization that did nothing for him or his teams in the southeast area of 
the country. 
12 Charlotte Watkins. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): An Analysis of their contribution to 
Security in Afghanistan.”.”  Institute for Afghan Studies, Oxford Brookes University (September 30, 2003), 
19-20.  Available at http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Projects/Watkins-PRT; 
Internet accessed on January 9, 2007.  The CJCMOTF personnel were told to wear civilian clothes for force 
protection purposes; that is, they would be safer if they were to blend into the environment.  Before more 
adjacent property could be rented next to the CJCMOTF building, personnel lived throughout the city in 
safe houses.  Soldiers in the CHLC wore a mix of civilian clothes and uniforms for the same reason.  I was 
working as an aide-de-camp to BG John Kern, the director of CMO, at Central Command in Tampa, FL 
when this issue was debated and, later, saw it firsthand when I was deployed to Afghanistan. 
13 In previous mission such as Kosovo and Bosnia, clear roles were established between the military 
and aid workers of their roles.  In Bosnia, for example, the Dayton Accord specifically stated what the 
military would not be involved in reconstruction efforts.  
14 In Bosnia, OHDACA was not available to U.S. forces.  Soldiers only had two types of funds:  
Commander’s Emergency Relief Funds (CERPs), which were much smaller than today, and Troop 
Training Projects (TTPs) that could not exceed $1200.  Therefore, Civil Affairs Teams had to use 
networking skills to persuade IO/ NGOs to build their projects that they accessed.     
15 MAJ Peggy Murray, who headed the office of Humanitarian Assistance and De-mining at 
CENTCOM, was instrumental in streamlining the process. 
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send its field workers into the rural areas because they could stay in the Coalition 
Humanitarian Liaison Cells for weeks at a time.16  The Civil Affairs Teams would 
provide escorts for field workers, so they could do on site assessments and approve the 
projects.  The CJCMOTF had already created a climate for civil military teams to work 
together.17  
B. U.S. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS - AFGHANISTAN 
By late summer of 2002, Coalition Joint Task Force — 180 (CJTF-180), which 
consisted of coalition of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), had virtually contained Al-
Qada and Taliban forces along the Pakistan boarder.  ISAF had stabilized and created a 
relatively secure environment for the capital city of Kabul.  President Karzai had just 
been elected by an emergency Loya Jirga as the head of the ATA government until 
elections could be held in mid-2004.18 
During this period, stabilization and reconstruction activities were not coordinated 
or integrated into any long-term plan for the country.  This was not due to lack of trying.  
Rather, in the previous January, the United Nations, United States, and the Afghanistan 
Interim Administration (AIA) convened a donor conference in Tokyo in which countries 
pledged donations and coordination of all reconstruction activities. 
Numerous problems thwarted reconstruction. First, President Karzai needed to 
move his influence into the areas that the U.S. led Coalition occupied.  However, the 
majority of all occupied areas were under the control of local and regional warlords that 
had only pledged verbal loyalty to the new government.  The challenge for the 
government was how to begin to exert influence and, later, to co-opt the warlords.  
Second, U.S. forces were too few, numbering only around seven thousand military 
personnel, to not only support the central government in controlling the country, but to 
also fight Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces along the border of Pakistan.  Third, the Afghan 
                                                 
16  Dr. Deborah Alexander argues that the CHLCs had PRT capabilities by the fact USAID OTIs were 
working out of them.   
17 Dr. Deborah Alexander who worked for USAID/ Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) in 
Afghanistan from 2002-2004. Interview by phone on April 27, 2007.  
18Ibid., 20. 
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government asked the UN to expand the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul.  However, 
contributing countries, mostly from Europe, resisted this request because it would expand 
the number of soldiers beyond five thousand.19  The U.S. also resisted the expansion 
because it did not want ISAF soldiers in areas where it was conducting combat 
operations.20 
The planners of CJTF-180 saw opportunities in all of these challenges to integrate 
reconstruction and military activity toward two common goals:  one, to move control of 
the Karzai government out of the capital of Kabul into the thirty-four provinces of the 
country and, two, to defeat Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces.21   Their solution was modeled 
on the Civil Organization and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program 
during the Vietnam War which created joint civilian military teams to work at the 
provincial and local level (See Appendix A).22  
The PRT concept evolved over time.  The original name, Joint Regional Teams 
(JRT), was changed to PRT at the request of President Karzai who wanted to emphasize 
the extension of governing authority into the provinces.  The first six PRTs were 
originally planned to be established in the Southeast where combat was still active.  
However, President Karzai changed this and they were instead spread out across the 
country in Gardez, Masar-e-Shariff, Bamyan, Bagram, Herat, and Kandahar 23  Finally, 
PRTs expanded to include interagency representatives from the U.S. Department of State 
                                                 
19 Alexander interview. 
20Ibid., 19-20. 
21 Lieutenant Colonel John Dickenson, Deputy J-5, CJTF-180 from 2002-2003. Interview by 
telephone on April 2, 2007. Also, see Craig T. Cobaine, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security 
Assistance: Comments on an Evolving Concept.” DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance 
Management 27, no. 4 (Wright-Patterson AFB, summer 2005) 91-98) Available from Proquest.  Accessed 
Internet on August 26, 2006. 
22 Ibid.  Also, to better understand the CORDS program and the similarities and differences to PRTs, 
read Robert W. Komer’s Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (1986), 113-22.  
He was the first director of the program.  Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 215-233 and 260-61; and Dr. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 164-67, offers a brief description of the program and why the Army rejected it. 
23 Robert M. Perito. “Special Report: The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan: Lessons Identified,” United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC: October 2005), 15.  
Bagram PRT is also referred to as Parwan PRT. 
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(DOS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), 
USAID, and representatives from the Afghan government.24   
Once the plan was finalized, the implementation of the PRTs fell upon Colonel 
Michael Stout, the Deputy Commander of the CJCMOTF.  Since the PRTs had no funds 
or equipment, Colonel Stout had to use his networking skills within CJTF-180 to 
convince it to give up internal resources in order to establish the first PRT.  Finally, in 
February 2003, the U.S. opened its first PRT in Gardez.  This PRT was so robust in force 
protection that its base looked like a French fort in the movie Beau Guest.  Building upon 
the successful establishment of the Gardez PRT, CJTF-180 established PRTs in Masar-e-
Shariff, Bamyan, Bagram, Herat, and Kandahar by the end of the year. 
                                                 
24 Colonel Michael Stout, Deputy Commander CJCMOTF, who established the first PRT in 2002-
2003.  Interview by telephone August 23, 2006.  He also showed me his brief “Afghanistan PRT-IO” 




Figure 1.   U.S. and ISAF/ NATO PRT locations.25 
 
Over time the U.S. PRTs developed three characteristics: First, the PRT was part 
of its counterinsurgency operations against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces and, as such, 
was to be located in hostile areas of the country.  Second, the PRT was to use quick 
impact projects and reconstruction activities as incentives for the local population to 
switch sides.  Consequently, PRTs had no problem withholding aid to villages if they 
were deemed sympathetic to the Taliban.  Third, the U.S. PRTs were still military-led and 
had no immediate transition plan for being handed over to the DOS or to the Afghan 
government (See Appendix B).  
                                                 
25 Based on the ISAF/NATO Handbook (February 2007). 
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C. ISAF/ NATO PRTS — AFGHANISTAN 
After initial skepticism, the PRT concept became amenable to ISAF when NATO 
assumed the UN mandate in October 2003.26  NATO had already supported ISAF 
logistically through the previous summer by helping support Germany and the 
Netherland to establish a joint-headquarters to run the ISAF mission.  Logically, the next 
step would be for NATO to assume full control of the mission.27  
Further, the PRT concept overcame the European and U.S. objections to large 
troop increases.  Europe’s original projection saw a troop increase from 5,000 to 25,000 
troops outside of Kabul.28  PRTs became an economy of force solution: small footprint 
and high impact.  For the U.S., ISAF PRTs met practical problems by not having ISAF 
troops in U.S. zones where there was active combat.  Thus, ISAF troops would only 
operate PRTs in the passive zones.  Proponents of this solution called it the “ISAF 
effect.”29  In December 2003, NATO authorized PRTs to expand into the rest of the 
country.30 
ISAF/ NATO PRTs were only established in permissive environments.  This 
allowed ISAF/ NATO PRTs to avoid the issue of the humanitarian principle of neutrality 
that plagued Americans.  ISAF PRTs tried to keep its military units out of reconstruction 
and development activities (See Appendix C). Each PRT developed its own national 
characteristic with national caveats regarding its missions.  The following descriptions of 
British and German-led PRTs illustrate this point. 
 
                                                 
26 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 officially expanded the ISAF mission to include 
the whole country.   
27Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Handbook Vol I & II, Version 3. International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF)/ NATO/ UNMA (Kabul, Afghanistan: February 3, 2007), D-2-1.  In December 
2001, ISAF was created, in accordance with the Bonn Conference and the UN passed eight different 
Security Council Resolutions extending the mandate.  Charlotte Watkins gives a good account in Chapter 3 
(17-21).  
28 Watkins, 20. 
29 Ibid., 20. 
30 ISAF PRT Handbook, 2. 
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1. British PRT — Masar-e-Shariff 
In July 2003, the British government (UK) assumed control of the PRT in Masar-
e-Shariff.31  The British government brought in approximately 100 personnel, equally 
divided among military personnel and civilians.  The PRT was run by the military, but its 
lead civilian development agency, the Department of International Development (DFID), 
supervised and had firm control over all reconstruction and development projects. 
Consequently, there were few civil-military conflicts with international and non-
governmental agencies: 
DFID has stipulated that funding has not been used on projects deemed to 
be better serviced through the capabilities of NGOs (such as water 
provisioning, education and health services), and has stressed that they 
hope to maintain a clear separation between PRT and NGO activities.32 
The British PRT concept of operation was more precise than that of the U.S. 
because it included security sector reform (SSR), supported institution building, and 
promoted economic development.33  Moreover, these three areas were roughly aligned 
with government departments and agencies:  Security and SSR belonged to the Ministry 
of Defence (MOD); institution building belonged to the Foreign Commonwealth Office 
(FCO); and promoting economic development belonged to DFID (see Figure 2). 
If the IO/ NGOs were not in the area, the military only did quick impact projects.  
For example, the UK military stopped building mobile health clinics or health camps in 
the city of Saripul when the NGOs complained that it was competing with their work in 
the area.34  
                                                 
31 ISAF PRT Handbook,, D-3-2. 
32 Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian – Military relations in Afghanistan. Save the 
Children (UK) (London: 2004), 26. 
33 Ibid., 20. 
34 Ibid., 22. 
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Figure 2.   UK PRT Masar-e-Sariff. 35 
 
2. German PRT — Konduz 
In 2004, the German-led PRT in Konduz was the largest, with 300 plus personnel 
including 30 civilians.36  Like the U.S. and UK approaches, the German PRT model in 
Konduz was country-centric. This meant that the PRT was designed by the German 
Government and its needs, not by ISAF HQs in Kabul.   
While the command structure is clearly divided between the civilian and the 
military personnel, their perspective activities seem to blur, or even cross over, into each 
other’s jurisdictions.  For example, the military has a medical company, a country 
information advisor for information operations, and a Civil Military Cooperation (CMIC) 
company.37  Further, they provided medical and logistical support to the local community 
                                                 
35 Peter Viggo Jakobsen. “PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient.”  Danish Institute for 
International Studies (June 2005), 22.  Available at http://www.diis.dk/sw11230.asp; Internet accessed on 
August 12, 2006. 
36 Ibid., 23-26. 
37  CIMIC is a NATO and European term that roughly translates to Civil Affairs. 
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as well as minor reconstruction projects, such as police stations and water projects.  The 
Foreign Ministry Representative conducts a broad spectrum of activities ranging from 
security sector reform to infrastructure support (see Figure 3).38 
 
Figure 3.   German PRT Konduz Organizational Chart. 
A unique German characteristic of this PRT is its micromanagement and control 
by Berlin.  Konduz civilian agencies answer directly to Berlin and this circumvents 
Kabul.  The Foreign Ministry, along with Ministry of Interior and the Economic 
Cooperation and Development, fill all of their civilian positions.  The Germans go further 
to ensure complete separation by not allowing any of the civilians to be under ISAF 
control. 39 
D. GOVERNORATE SUPPORT TEAMS (GSTS) — IRAQ 
When PRTs per se were introduced to Iraq in 2005, the concept itself was not new 
to the two-year U.S.-led occupation.  Joint interagency team concepts had been tried 
before as Governorate Support Teams (GSTs).  Two years earlier, in March 2003, on the 
                                                 
38 Jakobsen, 26. 
39 Ibid. 
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eve of the invasion of Iraq, a similar concept was introduced by Central Command and 
was referred to as the Governorate Support Teams.40  In a central Command 
“FRAGORD 09-87” released on March 3, 2003, GST was to be the hub to synchronize 
both the governance and the public administration efforts across the spectrum of 
reconstruction.41  It would take months before the Governorate Support Teams would 
become operational throughout the country and they still faced many obstacles.  
The first obstacle that the Governorate Support Teams faced was acceptance.  The 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) saw them as threats to their regional headquarters.  
One regional administrator objected to Governorate Support Teams, “What is the point of 
having regional Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters if these things exist?”42  
Second, neither the military nor the Coalition Provisional Authority could fill the 
personnel requirements for these teams.  The military, in the original request for forces, 
had not planned for these organizations.  Some Marine and Army Brigades tried to fix 
this by having their Civil Affairs Teams fill the military portion of the organizations.  
Meanwhile, the civilian job description required graduate education and extensive field 
experience which precluded many position from being fulfilled.  A later solution to this 
problem was to drop the education and field experience.    
Because of their association with the Coalition Provincial Authority, Governorate 
Support Teams disbanded when the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved in June 
                                                 
40 “Governorate Support Team.”.” Central Command (PowerPoint June 2003).  When I was a CMO 
LNO planner for CFLCC and 352 CA CMD, I saw an earlier version of this slide presentation, in March 
2003.  The June copy is the only hard copy I have available. 
41 FRAGORD 09-087 Governorate Support Teams (March 3, 2005).  This FRAGO directs CFC 
Forces to provide all support necessary to establish a central coordination mechanism within each 
Governorate of Iraq.  FRAGO is an acronym for Fragmentation Order which is a modification to the 
Operations Order (OPORD).  Hundreds of FRAGOs are issued during an operation.  Only the S3/ G3/ C3/ 
J3 on the commander’s staff have the authority to issue FRAGOs. 
42 When I was the Humanitarian Air Operations Officer at the Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC), from 
April to October 2003, one of the CA officers at CPA told us this story in a 352 CA CMD GST meeting as 
example of the difficulty of setting up these organizations. 
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2004.  However, the knowledge and experience of the Governorate Support Teams, along 
with the Afghan PRTs, would help lay the foundation for the future PRT a year later.43  
E. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRTS — IRAQ 
The former Iraqi Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who also served as U.S. 
Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003–2005, and John Negroponte, the first U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq, have been credited for bringing the PRT concept to Iraq.44  
Ambassador Negroponte tried to create the Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) for each 
province and directed DOS to set them up.  Unenthusiastic about this idea, DOS did not 
try to develop them past the conceptual stage.45  However, when Ambassador Khalilzad 
came to Iraq, he made them a priority and received support from Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice.   On November 11, 2005, Secretary Rice inaugurated the first Iraq 
PRT in the northern city of Mosul, declaring that the PRT would “… marry our 
economic, military, and political people in teams to help local and provincial 
governments get the job done.”46  Eventually, DOS would stand up seven PRTs at the 
end of 2006.  Coalition partners would set up three more in Al Basra (UK), An Nasiriyah 
(Italian), and Erbil (South Korea) (See Figure 4). 
                                                 
43 Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Goddard, U.S. Army Civil Affairs, MNF-I C9 Planner from 2005-2006.  
Interviewed in person on April 22, 2007.  His PowerPoint slide presentation, “The Way Ahead: Provincial 
and regional Reconstruction Teams (PRT/RRT).”.” MNF-I, C9. (PowerPoint on February 13, 2004) has 
been turned into a narrated presentation and can be found on NPS Blackboard, Cebrowski Institute, in the 
PRT Distance Learning Module developed by Dr. Karen Guttieri. 
44 Robert M. Perito, “Special Report: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq” United States Institute 
of Peace (Washington, DC: March 2007), 1. Also, Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Goddard said the same in his 
interview on April 22, 2007.  
45 LTC Goddard interview. 
46 Perito, PRTs in Iraq, 1.   
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Figure 4.   DOS PRT locations (Embed PRTs not included).47 
 
Three characteristics distinguish the American PRTs in Iraq from those in 
Afghanistan. First, the Department of State (DOS) established and supervised the Iraq 
PRTs.48  The primary reason for this was that the PRTs in Afghanistan were supposed to 
transition from military to DOS control.49  However, because of manning and funding 
problems, this never happened.  So, when Multinational Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) CMO 
Directorate (C9) planned the establishment of the first nine PRTs, they made sure that 
                                                 
47 Slide created by the author for his PRT presentation for his class, Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Capstone Presentation. 
48 Ibid.  
49 I have not been able to find any MOAs or MOUs that specifically state this but, from interviews, the 
planners and executors for the Afghan PRTs assumed that DOS would, at some point in the near future, 
take them over. 
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DOS took charge from the outset.50  Second, the Multinational Forces – Iraq C9 planning 
team sought to apply other lessons from the Afghan and GST experiences.  A Foreign 
Service Officer (FSO) who was on the Multinational Forces – Iraq C9 planning team had 
served on a GST and thought it offered a good concept which built the foundation of 
PRTs.51  The planners tried to set up a framework and to build infrastructure to ensure 
that PRTs were given direction and to integrate the PRTs into a national strategy.  The 
result was the creation of the National Coordination Team (NCT).52  The PowerPoint 
slide in Figure 5 shows the coordination and integration links from the PRTs up through 
the dual chain of command.53  
 
 
Figure 5.   PRT Line of Coordination and Authority.54 
                                                 
50 Goddard interview.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Goddard interview. 
54 CALL Iraq PRT Handbook, 16. 
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Third, the planners wanted to make sure that the PRTs were supporting successful 
local programs and wanted a transition plan in which the local Iraqi government would 
assume control at some point in the future.55  They saw the USAID’s Local Governance 
Program (LGP) as the foundation for the Iraqi Provincial government to assume control.  
The Local Governance Program was to train local Iraqi leaders in public administration 
and transparency.  What also made them a good choice was that the PRT primary support 
would be governance - not reconstruction.56  The planning team mission statement 
reflects this: 
To assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and 
sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and rule of 
law, promoting political and economic development, and providing 
provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the 
population.57 
This mission statement would not change and became the basis for “Embed” 
PRTs (See Appendix D). 
F. EMBED PRTS — IRAQ 
In 2007, as DOS regional PRTs were still being established across the 18 
Provinces, General David Petraeus, the new Multinational Forces – Iraq commander, 
introduced 10 Embed PRTs as part of his surge strategy to secure Baghdad.58  Unlike the 
DOS led PRTs, Embed PRTs were assigned to Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and 
smaller geographic areas.  As shown on the Baghdad map below (See Figure 6), seven 
Embed PRTs would cover Baghdad alone.  Also the Embed PRT concept allowed local 
military commanders to control and influence PRTs activities in their sector, responding 
                                                 
55 CALL Iraq PRT Handbook, 16. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Goddard interview, 3. 
58 MAJ Glenn Woodson, NPS Student who traveled to Iraq and visited PRTs from January 13–
February 16, 2007.  Interviewed in person on March 29, 2007.  His presentation, “Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams: An Oral Interview” (PowerPoint on March 29, 2007), has been turned into an 
articulate and can be found on NPS Blackboard, Cebrowski Institute, in the PRT Distance Learning 
Module, developed by Dr. Karen Guttieri. 
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to the criticism that PRT activities were too independent of combat operations.  Now 
Brigade Commanders could use the PRT activities to help shape their fight.  The Embed 
PRT concept also empowered the civilians.  In matters of reconstruction, the civilian 
director of Embed PRTs would have equal status with the BCT commander   
Also, General Petraeus’ concept was to have Embed PRTs work closely with 
local police forces, called Joint Security Stations.  The Embeds became part of his overall 
counterinsurgency strategy to put coalition troops back in the towns and on the streets.  
Whether this was General Petraeus intention or not, Embed PRTs became an economy of 
force like the Afghan PRTs.  Unable to put a one-to-twenty ratio of security force to the 
population of 26 million, the Embed PRTs became a solution to countering the 
continuous criticism of not enough security forces.   
Another characteristic of Embed PRTs is location.  Embeds would not be placed 
across the country, but in strategic hotspots.  General Petraeus envisioned only ten 
Embed PRTs, seven of them in Baghdad and three in Al Anbar Province.59 
 
                                                 
59 Woodson interview. 
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Figure 6.   Map of Embed PRTs in Baghdad.60 
 
Just like the start ups in Afghanistan and the DOS PRTs, these Embed PRTs are 
ad hoc and the personnel and equipment will come from existing units until the DoD 
Force Management process can catch up to resource them.  For example, functional 
experts will not arrive in the country until mid-summer 2007 and this is a “stop gap” 
measure with Army Civil Affairs Functional Experts filling a need until DOS can find 
their own experts.  How the embeds plan to coordinate and integrate with the DOS 
Provincial PRTs has still not been worked out by either the Strategic Mission Council or 
the Executive Steering Committee.  Finally, while the Embeds work closely with Brigade 
Combat Teams, the funds for reconstruction still come from Baghdad – it is still a 
hierarchical system.  The Embeds are experiencing growing pains similar to those of 
DOS PRTs and PRTs in Afghanistan.  So much for lessons learned (See Appendix G).  
This brief sketch of the history of the PRTs demonstrates that the only similarity 
among the four sets of PRTs developed in Afghanistan and Iraq — other than in name — 
                                                 
60 Woodson interview.  
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was that they attempted to be joint interagency teams at both regional and local levels.  
The next chapter discusses the successes and controversies that PRTs generated from the 
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III. PRT SUCCESSES AND CONTROVERSIES 
While most written work on PRTs focuses on controversies, I read about some 
successes.61  This chapter describes both the successes and controversies of PRTs.  Some 
PRT successes are in the areas of security, security sector reforms, and local governance.  
The controversies of PRTs cover some operational areas, such as humanitarian space, and 
PRT attributes, such as lack of information sharing.  The successes and controversies of 
the PRTs mostly refer to the Afghan experience. This is because four years have passed 
which allows for more in depth critical review than the ones in Iraq.  However, the Iraq 
effort has not escaped negative press.  As time passes, Iraq PRTs will suffer the same 
scrutiny that Afghan PRTs did.  
A.  PRT SUCCESSES 
The literature has been mixed on how successful PRTs have been.  Depending on 
one’s criteria and one’s worldview, PRTs have been a partial success.  Michael J. 
McNerney concludes, “PRTs have shown tremendous improvement from the muddled 
early days.”62  Peter Viggo Jakobsen believes, “PRTs are successful but not sufficient.”63  
Robert Borders argues that the PRT concept “… is a proven, flexible model for post-
conflict reconstruction…”64 
1. Security 
Despite criticism that the 2004 Save the Children (UK) report heaped on PRTs, it 
also recognized successes in security.  The mere presence of the PRTs can “reduce the 
                                                 
61 Most of the stories come from interviews, conducted over the past six months,  with military 
officers who were involved in the planning, execution, or command. 
62 Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a 
Muddle?” Parameters (Winter 2005-06), 44. 
63 Jakobsen and Peter Viggo, “PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient.”  Danish Institute 
for International Studies (June 2005). His thesis of his report is that future PRTs need to model themselves 
on the UK. 
64 Robert Borders, United States Army. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model 
for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development” Journal of Development and Social Transformation 
(The Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, 2004), 11. 
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propensity for local conflict between warlords.”65  Also, the PRTs have “a reach back” 
capability to bring more reinforcements when needed.66  In some instances, PRTs have 
relied on the ultimate “stick” – bombs from above.67  Two examples are cited in the ISAF 
PRT handbook as successful security tasks: PRT Masar-e-shariff helped negotiate a 
peaceful solution when warlord Dostum, an Uzbek, and Atta, a Panjir Tajik, almost went 
to war over disputed territory.68  PRT Herat helped negotiate the transition of Fahim 
Khan out of power, a regional warlord who had been in power since 2001. 
2. Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
A positive unintended consequence of PRTs has been the support of the Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
process.  PRTs, especially those under ISAF/NATO, have taken up security sector reform 
by training local police and supported DDR.69  In its mission statement, the PRT 
handbook states that security sector reform is one of its tasks.70  PRTs have become hubs 
where local police chiefs share information on criminal activity, such as illegal 
checkpoints. 
While DDR was not an original task of PRTs, they took on the mission later when 
SSR was added to the task list.71  PRT support for the DDR process evolved as a result of 
the Afghan Ministry of Defense’s New Beginning Program, an effort to disarm local 
militias, and as a result of the on going training of the Afghan National Army (ANA).72  
Coincidentally, as the DDR process got started in 2004, ISAF/ NATO began to move out 
                                                 
65 Save the Children (UK), 29. 
66 Ibid. 
67 McNerney, 41 
68 ISAF PRT Handbook, D-2-2. 
69 Ibid., 42 
70 ISAF PRT Handbook, 2. 
71 Stout interview.  COL Stout was told that DDR would be a UN mission and his PRTs would not 
conduct or support this activity. 
72 Yuji Uesugi, Research Fellow, “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and their 
Contribution to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process in Afghanistan.” 
Hiroshima University Partnership for Peacebuilding and Social Capacity (HIPEC) 3.  Available at 
home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/hipec/ja/products/RP3.pdf; Internet accessed on May 25, 2007. 
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of Kabul via the PRTs.73  Consequently, two-thirds of DDR completion occurred in areas 
where PRTs operated.74  While PRTs cannot be given sole credit for the DDR success for 
that year, they were surely a critical contributing factor. 
3. Local Governance 
Finally, the one area that critics and proponents of PRT have agreed upon is that 
PRTs need to expand support for local governance.75  When PRTs get involved with 
local governance, they have a positive effect as seen in successes in local DDR programs 
and local government involvement with quick impact projects.  In Iraq PRTs support the 
Local Governance Program in their areas and likewise contribute to local governance.76 
B. PRT CONTROVERSIES  
Controversy over PRTs can be broken down into two categories: There is a 
philosophical question: Should PRTs engage in reconstruction and development?  And 
there is a practical question: Are PRTs set up for successes?   
1. Irreconcilable Philosophies: Humanitarian Space 
An NGO community criticism is that PRTs blur the line in aid work between the 
military and civilians.  This is a violation of “humanitarian space.”  The IO/NGO 
community defines humanitarian space as “… the independence and neutrality from 
military and political forces that allowed NGOs and, to some extent, the United Nations 
itself, to provide life-saving aid to needy civilians on all sides of the conflict.”77   
 
                                                 
73 Uesugi, “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams.” 
74 Ibid. 
75 McNerney, 42 
76 Goddard interview. 
77 Lara Olson, “Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan.”  Journal of Military and 
Strategic Studies 9, no. 1 Fall 2006, 9-10.  Also, the European Commission’s Directorate for Humanitarian 
Aid defines “humanitarian space” as “the access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to assess and 
meet humanitarian needs.”   
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Neutrality means that aid workers are distinguished from the military.  Specifically, aid 
workers stay independent from military coordination, or sharing workspace, projects, 
uniforms, and, also, vehicles. 
Most aid workers pride themselves on living in accordance with the guidelines of 
the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) of 1994. 
The primacy of the humanitarian imperative: 
The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a 
fundamental humanitarian principle, which should be enjoyed by all 
citizens of all countries. 
The independence of humanitarian aid: 
Humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be 
viewed as such.  Aid will not be used to further a particular political or 
religious standpoint… Humanitarian NGOs (NGHAs) shall endeavor not 
to act as instruments of government foreign policy.  NGHAs are agencies, 
which act independently from governments. 
Providing aid impartially: 
Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients 
and without adverse distinction of any kind.  Aid priorities are calculated on 
the basis of need alone.78 
Military commanders consider military necessity as well as humanitarian 
principles. With these guidelines in mind, aid workers complain that the military uses aid 
as a tactic, as depicted in the phrase “winning hearts and minds.”  This type of tactics 
compromises public perceptions of humanitarian assistance as politically neutral and 
have led the local population to see NGOs as simply part of the military.79  For example,  
 
                                                 
78 Save the Children (UK), 7. 
79 Olson, 13. 
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in the first year in Afghanistan, NGOs complained that Special Forces and Civil Affairs 
blurred the line by operating in civilian clothes and unmarked vehicles when conducting 
civic action projects.80 
According to the NGO community, this blurring of the line has resulted in 
increased violence against NGOs.81  According to Global Civil Society Yearbook, 
Afghanistan has become the most dangerous country in the world for aid agencies.  
Specifically, from the early 1990s to 2005, targeting of NGOs has increased by a 
significant number of 1,300 percent.82  Another report from the Afghanistan NGO 
Security Office reports a sharp increase in attacks on aid workers for 2003.83  After 24 
years of aid work in Afghanistan, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) pulled out and 
“…cited the assertion made by Taliban representatives after the killings that 
organizations like MSF work for U.S. interests and were therefore targets for future 
attacks.”84 
The data presented is irrefutable: violence toward NGOs has increased 
significantly, but the data itself may be debatable, even if their figures are correct.  It is 
hard to isolate the variable that PRTs are the cause.  For example, Islamic extremists do 
not follow the rules of the Geneva Convention and would target NGOs anyway whether 
or not PRTs are in the area.85  
                                                 
80 Michael J. Dziedzic, and Colonel Michael K. Seidl, “Special Report: Provincial Reconstruction 
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a. Treaty Obligation 
As mentioned, the rise of the PRTs in Afghanistan has raised several 
concerns on the part of both International Organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs).  This includes concerns about humanitarian security and the 
proper role of the military in reconstruction efforts.  The real question being asked by IOs 
and NGOs, and even some members of the military community, is: do PRTs have a place 
in post-conflict reconstructions (PCR) at all? In a private meeting between President 
George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell about the decision to invade Iraq, 
Secretary Powell warned the President about the U.S.’s obligation — “If you break it, 
you own it.”86  What Secretary Powell likely meant was that the United States, based on 
treaties and conventions, has certain treaty obligations to civilians on the battlefield and 
during military occupations.  
The two primary guiding documents are the Convention with Respect to 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Hague II (commonly referred to as the Hague 
Convention), and The Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (commonly referred to as the Fourth Geneva Convention).87  The Hague 
Convention is “… animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme hypothesis, the 
interest of humanity and the ever increasing requirements of civilization.”  The document 
covers the occupation’s obligation in Section III, “On Military Authority over Hostile 
Territory,” articles 42 – 56(Appendix F).88   
                                                 
86 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 57. 
87 Convention With Respect To The Laws And Customs Of War On Land (Hague, II) (July 29, 1899) 
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Convention) signed August 12, 1949. U.N.T.S. No. 973, vol. 75, 287. 
88 Ibid. 
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b. Minimizing the Differences 
While the different philosophies between NGOs and the U.S. military are 
irreconcilable, policy makers, NGO field workers, and military commanders should not 
ignore the issue of humanitarian space.  First, both seek to enable the Afghan people to 
enjoy peace: 
The U.S.-led coalition forces and the international humanitarian 
community share the common goal of assisting the Afghan people achieve 
a long-awaited stable and prosperous peace.  PRTs can be an important 
part of that effort without compromising the ability of the humanitarian 
community to contribute and help speed this important effort.89 
Second, there is a time and place when the military is the only actor that 
can deliver humanitarian assistance: 
Even the majority of the humanitarian community would generally agree 
that in situations of dire need, where access for humanitarian agencies is 
denied, there is a role for the military in providing life-saving assistance.  
In other words, military involvement is generally acceptable as a ‘last 
resort’ when no other agencies are either present or capable of acting.90 
The military, meanwhile, provides humanitarian assistance (or engage in 
civic action) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations because the population is the center 
of gravity in the conflict and both the rebels and the government are vying for the support 
of the people, who will ultimately bestow legitimacy (Figure 7).91  
 
                                                 
89 Boarder, 10. 
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91 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 
2006), 1-21.  The new COIN manual states legitimacy is the main objective.  In this section legitimacy of 
the government is derived when, “…most of its citizens voluntarily accept its rule.” 
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Figure 7.   Aspects of counterinsurgency operations.92 
 
Counterinsurgency campaigns must deliver quickly to build confidence 
within the population.  They cannot wait for others to conduct these programs. As shown 
above, civic action projects, such as medical clinics and other activities that characterize 
traditional humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects are used as incentives so that 
local population will support legitimate governance and not insurgent groups.  Currently, 
the U.S. and the Afghan government are conducting counterinsurgency operations in 
certain areas of Afghanistan and Iraq and PRTs are vital to this effort.  While this 
controversy is new, such methods have been used in the past by the British in Malaya and 
the U.S. in Vietnam and the Philippines.  What is different today the larger presence of 
international organizations and the existence of non-governmental organizations.  
The third consideration for minimizing the differences is that the U.S. 
military should only provide aid temporarily.  The military needs to ensure that it has a 
transition plan in place and advertised that either a civilian led organization or the host 
nation government will take over.  One logical point for transition could be when the area 
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2. Practical Issues: Gaps in Attributes of a PRT 
The second category of criticism with PRTs relates to practical issues of 
organizational design, integration, and methods of operation.  Problems with resources, 
qualified personnel, and training were inherent from the beginning because PRTs were 
hastily organized.  The ad hoc nature of the first PRT guaranteed a shortfall in resources, 
personnel, and training.  The ad hoc nature also affected the integration of the PRTs in 
the long-term reconstruction and development plan.  Finally, the biggest practical issue is 
the lack of civil information management capability to measure effectiveness. 
a. Lack of Resources, Personnel, and Training 
Colonel Michael Stout, who set up the first U.S. PRTs back in 2003, 
lamented that he had to beg, borrow, and steal from existing resources at CJTF-180 to 
stand up PRT Gardez.93  Finally, Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, commander of CJTF-
180, intervened and ordered his subordinate units to give Colonel Stout what they 
needed.  The order worked, but resources were still lacking. As one author described it 
that PRTs looked like those vehicles (SUVs) he saw in post-apocalyptic movie Mad Max 
— held together with duct-taped.94   
Resource problems have also plagued Iraq PRTs.  The DOS-led PRTs 
have been slow to establish because of lack of resources and interagency fighting.  
Resources have become such a problem that DoD and DOS fight over who paid for PRT 
meals.  Another example is that MNF-I C9 had to scrap a couple of PRT locations 
because the military closed its forward operating bases (FOBs). 
Slowly but surely, the resource problem is getting fixed as PRTs become 
part of the joint planning and manning process.  Military funding of PRTs is now built 
into the contingency plans and the President has included DOS PRTs as part of his 
supplemental appropriations request to Congress. 
                                                 
93 Stout Interview. 
94 McNerney, 36. 
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From a personnel point of view, many PRT civilian positions are still left 
unfilled for months and the ones that did show up were only there for 90 days.95  The 
PRT in Parwan was constantly short of interagency personnel. (See Appendix B; 2)   
Afghan PRTs are not the only ones suffering from personnel shortages.  
Talking about Iraq PRTs, Ambassador James Jeffrey, Department of State coordinator for 
Iraq policy, said in an interview that putting more civilian experts on the ground is neither 
possible nor necessary:  
The military talks to us about that all the time … The problem is that this 
would require tens of thousands more military personnel to provide 
security for them — and it’s a very big issue … The point is, do we need 
that many people? I’m skeptical.96   
Later, he also admitted that the Department of State does not have the 
people to send to Iraq.97 
Personnel shortages continue, but the 90-day tours have been replaced 
with one-year tours.  Also, DOS continues to recognize the problem and recommends, 
“To fill key U.S. PRT positions and better achieve assignment objectives, civilian 
agencies need to further develop policies and incentive structures.”98  Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice has tried to correct this by instituting her Transformational Diplomacy 
Road Map. This shifts Foreign Service Officers’ jobs from Europe and Washington, DC 
to the Third World, specifically the Middle East, and “pegs” promotions to hardship 
tours.99  So far, this has met resistance within the State Department culture.  According to  
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a poll released by the American Foreign Service Association in a recent newsletter, the 
majority of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) opposes promotion based on hardship 
assignments.100   
To help integrate civilian personnel with the military, 2006 USAID 
Assessment Report recommends aligning civilian tours to match military tours and to 
ensure future teams have collective training.101  Currently, DOS and DoD are moving in 
the right direction by conducting an introductory course on PRTs to both military and 
civilians heading into theater.102   
While the U.S. has done little in joint training prior to deployment, the 
British did this from the beginning when they assumed control of the PRT in Masar-e-
Shariff.103  Its teams trained and deployed together back in England.  This allowed both 
the civilians and the military to get to know each other’s culture and mission, and also, to 
let them feel out how to work together and support each other.  The result is that PRT 
Masar-e-Shariff became the successful model of choice for one Danish Institute study.104   
b. Lack of Integration 
Lack of integration has come in three forms: absence from the campaign 
plan, amateurism, and the duplication of effort. The original plan for PRTs was for them 
to be decentralized, but integrated work.  This helped ensure the right projects for the 
locals were being built.  However, NGOs complained that the PRTs were amateurs in the 
aid business by duplicating their projects in the same areas.  One NGO recommended that 
the military stay in its lane because humanitarian assistance is not a business for 
amateurs: 
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I can understand why the military forces are involved in these things.  The 
main reason is to conquer the hearts and minds of the people.  Mainly to 
stop being shot at, so they are seen as the good guys.  For an army it’s 
better to do this than kick in doors and insult people.  Leave the NGOs to 
build kindergartens.  Some things are better left to professionals.105  
The aid community recognizes that PRTs have the right cultural attitude.  
However, they accuse PRTs of not having the proper understanding of the locals’ specific 
needs.  In essence, PRTs do not listen to the locals.106  However, this could also reflect 
NGO’s own biases since no individual from the NGO community could not back up this 
claim with any evidence.  On the contrary, PRTs “did an excellent job involving local 
communities, hiring local workers, and sometimes trying to incorporate training 
components in their various projects.”107 
As for duplicating efforts and poor project management, for example, in 
Kandahar, the NGOs have accused the local PRT of duplicating their projects. 108  Civil 
Affairs teams have built elementary schools and secondary schools in the same areas of 
NGOs.109   Also, NGOs have challenged PRTs to remedy their poor project management, 
which have resulted in projects that are unsustainable and lacking community input.110  
NGOs frequently give examples of schools that have been built and not used.111  While 
this criticism is valid, the NGO community needs to take some responsibility for this as 
well.  If they want neutrality, but refuse to coordinate their activities with the military, 
duplication of effort is virtually assured.  To ISAF’s credit, it has tried to steer their 
military units in PRTs away from relief and reconstruction efforts and toward security 
sector reform.112   
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But even military commanders complained that PRTs acted autonomously 
without regard to their mission. They spent money and built projects that did not seem to 
be anchored toward any common goal.  Some even call them “Motel 6,” referring to 
PRTs as “All Things to All People.”113   
To help redress these issues, LTG David Barno, commander of CJTF-180 
from November 2003–2004, initiated five changes: First, he expanded the number of 
PRTs from eight to fourteen.  Second, he integrated PRTs by placing them under 
Regional Brigades.  Third, he ensured that all U.S. and NATO PRT Commanders were 
senior colonels.  Fourth, he moved the U.S. effort from a conventional to a 
counterinsurgency approach.  Fifth, he relocated his headquarters from Bagram Air Base 
to Kabul to better facilitate the integration of military, political, and economic efforts.114  
In 2005, the Afghan Government, the U.S., and ISAF established the PRT 
Steering Committee, headed by the Minister of Interior of the Afghan Government, to 
create a forum for consultation among the Afghan government ministries, U.S., ISAF, 
IOs/ NGOs to help prioritize all reconstruction projects.115 ISAF has also tried to create a 
framework by publishing a comprehensive handbook that addresses missions, purpose, 
tasks, and organizations.  Since January 1, 2007, CFC-A and ISAF duties have been 
merged under NATO.  Both U.S. and NATO PRTs are now under the same command.  
In 2003, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issued the Principles Guiding PRT 
Working Relations with UNAMA, NGOs, and Local Government to give the U.S. PRTs 
some framework.116  Endorsed by the PRT Steering Committee, this document 
“established three primary objectives for the PRT Program: extend the authority of the 
Afghan central government, improve security, and promote reconstruction.”  The State 
Department also created a PRT coordinator in 2004 to ensure that DOS personnel were 
integrated into the PRTs.  The coordinator later became an advocate for civilians who 
                                                 
113 McNerney, 36. 
114 Ibid., 38 
115 Perito, Lessons Identified, 2.  Also, the PRT Executive Steering Committee Charter can be found 
in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Handbook I & II, no. 3. International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF)/ NATO/ UNMA (Kabul, Afghanistan: February 3, 2007), B-1-1 to B-1-3. 
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were having problems with their military counterparts.117  With these steps, lack of 
integration has presumably become less of an issue. 
c. Civil Information Management (CIM) 
A major problem affecting PRT effectiveness is rarely mentioned as a 
problem and, further, does not show up in any PRT organizational charts for Afghanistan 
and Iraq: namely the inadequacies of PRT civil information management capability. The 
USAID Assessment Report is one of the few documents to acknowledge the problem: 
Many DOS and USAID PRT representatives indicated that they did not 
have reliable access to information about national projects in their 
province.  Their inability to provide comprehensive information about 
U.S. activities to PRT and regional commanders undermined civilian 
credibility and limited their ability to integrate their activities with national 
programs. 
For example, an initiative to map all development activities has been 
underway for a considerable period, but the information is still not easily 
accessible to field staff.118  
The only other references I have found to information management 
failures came in interviews.  For example, Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell, former 
commander of PRT Bagram, lamented that his PRT transition and continuity would have 
been better had he had a civil information management capability in place?119  When he 
arrived in Bagram, he was surprised that there was no system and few archives of CMO 
projects.  He assumed there would be a plethora of Excel spreadsheets.  As he pointed 
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out, if he had a civil information management capability, he would not have wasted 
months rebuilding data that previous commanders had collected. 120   
Not only would a civil information management capability help with 
project tracking, but it could alleviate inefficiencies when PRT teams transition and rotate 
in and out.121  This data could help campaign planners determine whether they are 
obtaining the desired effects toward their mission goals.  It could be likewise used to 
gauge how ongoing operations are affecting the civilian realm. Lieutenant Colonel 
Michael Warmack explained why Civil Information Management recently became 
recognized in doctrine as a core task for Civil Affairs soldiers: 
Civil information management … becomes a focal point for data 
collection at each level of operations.  The civil information management 
cell receives data from the CATs, the Coalition Liaison Teams (CLTs), 
and Functional Specialists in the field and processes the data to help build 
the civil common operating picture (COP).  The civil common operating 
picture is passed on to the commander through the Civil Affairs Planning 
Teams (CAPTs) who are analyzing the products for effects-base targeting 
and future planning.  The Civil Affairs Planning Teams inputs the civil 
common operating picture into the supported Commander’s common 
operating picture.  This results in decision superiority and improved 
effects-based Civil Military Operations activities.122  
Finally, a CIM could produce data and trends to help whether the 
successes and concerns cited by critics and proponents of PRTs are well-grounded.  
Currently, almost all support for both sides of the arguments has been anecdotal.  For 
example, as already mentioned, NGOs have accused PRTs of increased levels of violence 
toward them.123  Alternatively, critics have argued that PRTs do not bring real security 
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122 LTC Kenneth (Ritchie) Moore and LTC Michael Warmack, “Civil Affairs (CA) Transformation” 
(PowerPoint). Presented to Joint Special Operations University, March 24, 2006, 93. 
123 Olson, 10-14. 
 40
because the security footprint is insignificant.  They point to the statistical rise of 
violence against NGOs and to the fact that not one warlord has been held accountable for 
abuse of power.124  Beyond this, they offer stories from the field, but no concrete 
evidence.  On their part, proponents do not have data to support their positions either.  
One article reported that PRTs first tried to measure their success by the number of 
smiling Afghan children.125  Another attempt was to measure money spent on OHDACA 
projects.126  At the very least, with a civil information management system in place, 
proponents might just have a chance to rebut the charges. 
This chapter has addressed controversies — both philosophical and 
practical and has identified PRT shortfalls.  The next chapter will recommend ways to 
redress them; thus, improving PRTs’ overall effectiveness.  
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IV. IMPROVING PRT EFFECTIVENESS 
This chapter will recommend ways to improve effectiveness. First, I will examine 
what it means to measure effectiveness, especially when the performance is hard to 
quantify.  In both counterinsurgency and post-conflict stability environments, as 
witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq, identified measures of effectiveness continue to elude 
U.S. and ISAF/ NATO forces.   
Thus, I will explore the question, “What are the right metrics, and, why are they 
so hard to develop?”  I will explore different organizational approaches such as Save the 
Children (UK), ISAF, Multinational Forces – Iraq, and United States Institute for Peace 
(USIP).    
From the discussion on effectiveness, this chapter will recommend how to 
improve PRT internal attributes by adopting the new standing Civil Military Operations 
Center (CMOC) found in FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations.  Selecting commanders 
(military or civilian) with the right skill sets is the most important decision to ensure 
success of a PRT because the commander’s competence and networking skills can 
compensate greatly for overall PRT capability gaps.   
Finally, the focus up to this point has been the internal improvement of the PRT.  
This chapter considers what external factors, such as legislative fixes and improvements 
to the bureaucratic processes within the DoD and other government agencies, might 
improve effectiveness.     
A. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES)  
Measures of Effectiveness will have different meanings for different people.  For 
example, some may misunderstand “measure of effectiveness” to be a measure of effort 
(how many wells were dug today or how many militia persons have been disarmed?). For 
others, it may be a measure of performance (every soldier reported for duty today). It is 
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crucial, however, that the measure of effectiveness specifically addresses “an impact  
on the target” or “effectiveness for whom.” 127 
Traditionally, the military could measure effectiveness by the maximum damage 
done to the enemy with minimal damage to its own side.128  Effects Based Operations 
(EBO) is a perfect example of this traditional military MOE.  However, civil military 
effectiveness that PRTs are involved in is less quantifiable and more subjective.  For 
instance, how do you measure a return to normalcy, safety, and economic well-being?129  
When EBO is applied to the civil military dimension, it had difficulty measuring 
effectiveness.  
1. What are the Right Metrics?  
The pursuit of the right metrics must be grounded in the right questions.  
Unfortunately, scant attention in the PRT literature has been given to developing metrics 
to see if the PRTs are meeting their desired goals.  Most literature or reports have 
concentrated on job descriptions, reporting chains, and successful attributes of a PRT.  
Save the Children (UK) did try to create metrics that linked PRT activities to security 
outcomes (See Appendix I). 130  However, even with metrics for security, Save the 
Children only dealt with one task (security) in the PRT mission statement.  Alternatively, 
Michael J. McNerney attempted to measure success of an Afghan PRT by developing 
criteria for tactical-level coordination, building relationships, and building capacity.131   
Still, the question remains: Are these the right criteria?  To determine the right 
questions for effectiveness, I recommend first looking at specific PRT mission statements 
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for their tasks.  For example, analyzing both the mission statements from ISAF PRT and 
PRT Gardez and the DOS PRT statement from MFN-I C9, yields the following tasks:  
 
• Assist the host nation (Iraq or Afghanistan) to extend its authority 
• Help develop good governance (transparency, rule of law)  
• Develop a stable and secure environment  
• Enable Security Sector reform (police, DDR, de-mining) 
• Support reconstruction efforts (HN, IO/NGO, quick impact projects)132 
  
From these tasks, metrics can be developed along the lines of operations 
(governance, security, economics and social well being, and justice).  While these logical 
lines of operations are good, they are still too broad. Understanding this, the CALL PRT 
Handbook published the National Coordination Team assessment guide for measuring 
success (See Appendix G) that tries to narrow the focus within the logical lines.133  NCT 
tried to develop a 4-phase process to measure success.  However, an in-depth look reveals 
a primary problem with the assessment guide: the Handbook does not explain the 
methodology of the NCT metric.   
The best example of MOEs that I have come across is the United States Institute 
of Peace document called “Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation 
and Stabilization.”134  Like other models, they have stages to measure progress to get to 
their stated goals.135 USIP tries to use a hybrid of methodologies to measure 
effectiveness:  Content Analysis (CA), Expert Opinion (EO), Statistical Analysis (SA), 
and Survey/  
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See also Appendix 3. 
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Polling Data (S/PD) (See Appendix I).  In the example below, a goal to achieve political 
moderation and stable democracy is measured by applying the four methodologies to see 
if there has been improvement: 
Drivers of Conflict 
Competition for Absolute Power Diminished (Do political elites/leaders and 
identity groups perceive the political process in “zero-sum” terms?) 
Perception among identity group members that loss of power (e.g., to other 
identity groups) will preclude the prospect of regaining power in the future. 
(S/PD) 
Public rhetoric from political elites/leaders asserting that their rivals have 
negotiated the peace settlement in bad faith (i.e., that the settlement is a trick 
or that their rivals will manipulate the peace settlement to assert control over 
security forces). (CA) 
Number of assaults and assassinations perpetrated by members of one of the 
former warring factions against leaders of other identity groups. (SA) (EO)  
Number of assaults and assassinations perpetrated by members of one of the 
former warring factions against other members of their own identity group. 
(EO)136 
The USIP metrics seems promising.  However, unless it is coupled with a civil 
information management capability, it will be difficult — if not impossible — for 
commanders or anyone to accurately measure effectively a PRT other than anecdotes.   
B. THE PROBLEM OF ADHOCRACY  
Within the current PRT concept, is another element that makes it difficult to 
measure, and, until recently, a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) shares this 
attribute that still plagues PRTs – adhocracy.  According to Joint Civil Affairs doctrine, 
                                                 
136 Stages of Conflict Transformation and Stabilization, 8. 
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“a CMOC is an ad hoc organization...”137  Also, as different as the four PRTs discussed 
so far are, all of them conduct similar tasks of a traditional CMOC such as “… to assist in 
the coordination of activities of participating military forces, and other [U.S. government] 
USG agencies, nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations.”138  
A common issue of a PRT is establishment.  In all four cases, PRTs had huge 
growing pains because all of them were built from scratch from operational needs in the 
field.  When this happens, DoD and other government agencies in Washington DC will 
have to provide money, equipment, and personnel to include training.  Enormous 
bureaucracies are cumbersome.  Rules and regulations that develop organization 
processes and practices, such as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), Joint 
Operations and Planning Execution Systems (JOPES), mobilization, and union rules, are 
slow to react.139  To make matters worse, they usually resist changes.  According to 
James Q. Wilson in his seminal book Bureaucracy:  
These organizations resist innovations. They are supposed to do it.  The 
reason an organization is created is in large part to replace the uncertain 
expectations and haphazard activities of voluntary endeavors with the 
stability and routine of organized relationships.  The standard operating 
procedure (SOP) is not the enemy of organization; it is the essence of an 
organization.140  
 
                                                 
137 Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
April 14, 2003), xi. The full definition reads, “A CMOC is an ad hoc organization. Normally established by 
the geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, or other commanders to assist in the coordination 
of activities of participating military forces, and other USG agencies, nongovernmental, regional, and 
international organizations.” 
138 Ibid. 
139 POM is the DoD five-year budget that is produced every two years.  The POM also feeds into the 
Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) that looks fifteen years into the future.  It is fair to say that the U.S. 
Forces that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq were budgeted in the late 1990s.  A General Officer interviewed 
on September 4, 2006, told me that when he worked as a civilian in Army G4 in 1999, the Secretary of 
Defense vetoed the Army’s plan to armor all of the HUMVVs and give every soldier level-3 body armor.  
The reason given was that cost and troops behind the lines did not need it.  The U.S. Military deploys based 
on Joint Operations Plans and Execution  System (JOPES).  Planners who write the war plans feed the 
information called Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) into JOPES.  Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM) controls JOPES. 
140 James Q. Wilson. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989), 221. 
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Colonel Stout experienced this type of bureaucracy first hand with CJTF-180 
when he stood up PRT Gardez.  He would be the first person to argue that these 
commanders were not trying to undermine his success.  Rather, most were supportive of 
his mission; however, they defaulted to their bureaucratic tendencies and would not give 
up resources.141 
As long as PRTs start out as ad hoc organizations, gaps in the attributes 
mentioned in the previous chapter will remain a chronic problem.  United States Institute 
for Peace Coordinator for Afghanistan Robert Perito summed it up best, “The ad hoc 
approach taken in the PRT program is indicative of the overall U.S. response to the 
challenges of post-conflict intervention in Afghanistan.”142    
To address the problem of adhocracy, various experts have suggested operational 
changes, such as applying a different strategy, but without offering specifics such as 
better personnel or more funds.  For example, Robert Perito makes the following 
suggestions that, while noble and on the right track, are unrealistic:  
 
The USDA and other civilian agencies should fund and assign 
representatives.  
While USDA’s program lacked program funding and logistic support, the 
agency deserves credit for the effort, courage, and ingenuity of its 
volunteers. Other civilian agencies did not make such an attempt, but 
could make useful contributions.  These agencies should develop 
programs to recruit, train, equip, and deploy personnel with logistical 
support and program funding.  
The State Department should develop a program of public diplomacy for 
State representatives in PRTs.  
Currently, FSOs assigned to PRTs have no programs or project funding. 
There is a need, however, for public diplomacy, which is a traditional 
State Department function. Such an effort would replicate the role once 
                                                 
141 Stout interview.  I witnessed another incident that was indicative of this problem.  The Turkish Air 
Force Commander at Kabul International Airport requested a U.S. LNO.  The request took three months to 
fill.  Even though many officers at Bagram volunteered for the assignment, the CJTF-180 felt it could not 
give anyone up and requested that the position to be filled by DA back in Washington, DC.  
142 Perito, Lessons Identified, 14. 
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played by the U.S. Information Service’s educational and cultural 
programming. This would strengthen the role of the State representative, 
who would have a real “seat at the table” in the Project Review Committee 
and additional reasons to interact with Afghans. 
Match PRT military capabilities with a robust component of specially 
trained, adequately resourced, and logistically supported civilian 
representatives.  
Much could be achieved if the military component of the PRT was matched with 
a robust staff of civilian personnel. The Civil Operations and Rural Development 
Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam might provide a model for such a 
program…143    
Perito is asking for major changes to DOS culture and bureaucracy but, as noted 
in the previous chapter, this is being met with resistance by the American Foreign Service 
Association.144  Instead of changing the bureaucracy, it may be better to take into account 
the process already in existence in these different bureaucracies and use them to improve 
the PRT.  The next section will offer the new Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) 
as a way to use existing bureaucracies toward improving the PRTs. While this approach 
cannot resolve all of the shortfalls that current PRTs are experiencing, it can quickly 
close the gap.   
C. THE CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC) 
The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command 
(USACAPOC) Force Management Directorate (G8) has already done much of the hard 
work needed to improve effectiveness.  As mentioned earlier in the chapter, PRTs 
conduct tasks that CMOCs have traditionally performed (See Appendix H).  However, in 
2004-2006, USACAPOC G8 improved the CMOC by changing doctrine to transform it 
from an ad hoc organization to a permanent structure (or standing capability).  According 
to the new FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, a CMOC is: 
                                                 
143 Perito, Lessons Identified, 14  The author did give one recommendation that was specific when he 
called on Congress to create a new funding line: “Congress should pass legislation rationalizing the 
funding sources available to military and civilian personnel in stability operations.” 
144 An officer I interviewed told me the DOS culture is extremely resistant to Secretary Rice’s 
Transformational Diplomacy Initiative.  He heard her speech; when she was giving it, the FSO next to him 
told his friend, “Don’t worry about this.  All we have to do is wait her out.” 
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A standing capability formed by all Civil Affairs units from the company 
level to the Civil Affairs command levels that serves as the primary 
coordination interface for the United States armed forces among 
indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian organizations, 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational 
military forces, and other civilian agencies of the United States 
Government.145 
FM 3-05.40 also gives the CMOC a new task, developing the civil common 
operating picture: 
CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants 
….from local levels to international levels …and develops, manages, and 
analyzes the civil inputs to the civil common operating picture.146 
USACAPOC has already received Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) approval for the Force Document Updates 
(FDU) that reorganizes Civil Affairs units.147  This is significant because Force 
Document Updates become part of the Army and Special Operations Command’s 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which means that they must procure 
equipment, recruit and train personnel, and accept the CMOC as a standing capability 
(See Appendix I).148 
What does this mean operationally?  A CMOC conducts civil military operations 
(CMOC) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) via these core tasks: 
 
                                                 
145 Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations  (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 
2006), 2-5. 
146 Ibid.  This would be the basis for the creation of the Civil Information Management (CIM) core 
task and the CIM cell in the CMOC. 
147 U.S. Army Civil Affairs has split proponency, meaning they have two bosses.  Each boss is 
required approve any changes to CA organization.  When I worked at USACAPOC G8 from 2004-2005, I 
witnessed the painful process of watching all of the different agencies and command in both DA and 
SOCOM approve the new CA doctrine and FDUs.  Ironically, DA, which has traditionally has been hostile 
toward CA, approved the new CA doctrine and FDUs a year before SOCOM. MTOEs refer to Modified 
Table Organization & Equipment. 
148 A year after FM 3-05.40 approval and two years after the FDU approval, USACAPOC finally got 
CIM into the POM and is trying to get CIM to become a Program of Record.  Civil Affairs units, both 
active and reserve, are currently reorganizing in accordance with the new FDUs.   
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1. Key leader engagement by serving as the primary coordination interface 
between the U.S. and host nations, and IO/NGOs. 
2. Project management by tracking all humanitarian, stabilization, and 
reconstruction projects in the area of operations. 
3. Civil Reconnaissance by Civil Liaison Teams, Civil Affairs Teams, and 
Functional Experts on civil dimensions in the Area of Operations based on 
the methodology called ASCOPE. 
4. Civil Information Management (CIM) by developing, managing, and 
analyzing the civil inputs to the Commander common operating picture 
(COP). 
 
For example, according to two U.S. PRT mission statements, and the ISAF 
handbook, PRTs are, by definition, conducting some of the new CMOC tasks.  For 
instance, the PRT in Jalalabad, “… conducts civil-military operations in Nangarhar 
Province [in order to] facilitate reconstruction and development….”149  PRT Bagram’s 
“purpose slide” states “… facilitating reconstruction, development, and economic 
growth.”150  In the ISAF Handbook, the PRT mission is “…to facilitate the development 
of a stable and secure environment … enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
reconstruction efforts.”151 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the only task that PRTs are not currently 
performing is Civil Information Management (See Appendix J).  
Referring back to COL Stout’s story about the bureaucratic hurdles that he faced 
setting up PRT Gardez, imagine what could have happened if he had access to the new 
CMOC.  He would not have had to plead with commanders of existing units to give up 
supplies, resources, and personnel to meet his deadlines.  He would not have had to ask  
 
 
                                                 
149 Lieutenant Colonel James Ruf, who was PRT Jalalabad commander from 2004-2005. Interview by 
phone in July 2006. He also showed me his Command Brief, “PRT Command Brief, NDK” (PowerPoint), 
7. 
150 McDonnell, 10. 
151 ISAF PRT Handbook, 3-4. 
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LTG McNeill, the JTF Commander, to force his staff and subordinate commanders to 
release their resources to him.  His capability would already have been in the Army 
inventory and ready to go. 
1. When Does a CMOC Become a PRT? 
Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry expresses frustration when he hears claims that PRTs 
are a joint civil-military innovation.  His response is, “A PRT is a CMOC on steroids.”152 
Having served the Civil Affairs community for most of his career, he and other 
officers recognize that the civil or interagency part of the CMOC is “the steroids.”  A 
CMOC becomes a PRT when the interagency folded into the organization.  The decision 
for interagency participation will be decided by policy makers.  However, CMO planners 
and Civil Affairs officers acting as Principal CMO advisors to the JTF commander will 
help determine when the interagency needs to be involved (See Appendix K).153   
 
                                                 
152 Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry, formerly the Assistant Chief of Staff (G3) of USACAPOC and 
currently Commander of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne). Interviewed by telephone on June 6, 
2006.  COL Stout has made the same statement to me.  
153 Principal CMO Advisor is usually an S9, G9, C9, or a J9 on the commander’s staff.  The letter 
destination refers to which level of command the CMO staffer serves. 
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Figure 8.   Standing Capability of the new CMOC. 
 
2. Putting It Together: A CMOC Transitions into a PRT 
A CMOC>PRT is the JTF commander’s/ U.S. Ambassador’s ideal tool for 
shaping his civil-military environment.  Because the PRT is built on the foundation of the 
new standing CMOC, it is modular, scalable, and sufficiently flexible to perform the full 
range of civil-military activities.  Basically, the CMOC>PRT is similar to a Christmas 
tree with plug and play capabilities (CIM function experts, Civilian Liaison Teams, and 
interagency).  The CMOC>PRT is the focal point for collaboration, coordination, and 
communication, primarily dealing with the civilian sector. 
CMOC>PRT focuses on the civil battle rhythm and manages functions within and 
around the commanders’ areas.  This may include elections, donor conferences, and 
priority requirements to support indigenous authorities, the linking of resources for 
stabilization and reconstruction, and the identification of civil flashpoints, indicators, and 
warnings. 
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The new CMOC brings another standing capability: Civilian Liaison Teams 
(CLTs).  This is the storefront that offers IOs/NGOs and indigenous institutions 
unfettered access to the military.  Civilian Liaison Teams engage key leaders in the 
community and reach out to be IO/NGO community through hosting and attending 
meetings to exchange information.  By conducting civil reconnaissance, they have also a 
key node in the civil information network. 
Further, the new CMOC has Functional Experts who are ready to support 
specialized projects needed for the civil-military operations campaign plan.  These 
experts may help with planning, assessment, and supporting the civil administration.  In 
addition, the interagency will also bring other experts to enhance the PRT’s capabilities. 
By using the Civil Information Management cell, the CMOC>PRT can look at the 
second order effects of civil-military actions on the populations.  It will maximize and 
synchronize civil activities and resources among disparate organizations.  For instance, if 
President Karzai needs health care in the north, then CMOC>PRT can coordinate military 
and civilian health related resources for this region.  In the context of the civil campaign, 
CMOC should have the coordinating lead. 
D. THE INTERAGENCY PUZZLE 
1. The Problem  
The interagency shortfalls make for the biggest gap that plagues the PRT. For 
example, from the USAID Assessment Report:  
In filling key U.S.-PRT positions, civilian agencies need to further 
develop policies and incentive structures to better achieve assignment 
objectives. …Civilian personnel assigned to PRTs need to be capable of 
making key assessments, refining analysis, and implementing response 
activities.  Early in the PRT implementation, desirable skills for personnel 
could include short-term stabilization and conflict mitigation experience. 
Subsequent staffing might well emphasize expertise in the development of 
basic infrastructure for security sector reform and local governance.  
Additionally, civilian agencies must do more to find senior staff for PRT 
positions. Because of staff shortages, DOS, USAID, and USDA were 
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generally able to put only one representative on each PRT or regional 
command.  In the startup phase, many civilian slots remained vacant... 
While USAID, DOS, and USDA were able to eventually staff most 
positions, many civilian representatives lacked the experience to function 
as leaders on the PRT or were short-term volunteers…junior or non-direct 
hire staff civilian representatives often lacked experience with and 
knowledge of their own agencies.  By comparison, most of their military 
counterparts had 16–20 years experience prior to PRT command.154  
To compound the inexperience problem, the interagency coordination piece is the 
most difficult puzzle to solve.  USAID and DoD recognizes this: “There are significant 
limits to what civilian agencies can do to address this issue given current funding and 
staffing levels.”155 
There is no reason to keep reinventing the wheel.  The DoD already understands 
and is now prepared to provide resources for the new standing CMOC. From the civilian 
side, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Team is the closest 
comparison to the CMOC; but they are only temporary, short term, and only called upon 
in emergencies.  While DoD has many subcultures within its organization, it is more 
monolithic than the rest of the U.S. government.  Other agencies within the other U.S. 
Departments (Treasury, State, etc…) are not only independent, but have their own rules, 
regulations, and culture.  Even within bureaus, they have their own way of doing things.  
When Congress gave reconstruction duty in Iraq to the DOS it appeared to make sense.  
However, DOS is oriented toward diplomacy between states, and not post-conflict 
processes within them. One joins DOS to be a diplomat – not an aid worker.  This is the 
reason why USAID exists.156   
Third, DoD does not have to deal with unions or other labor regulations.  For 
example, other government agencies cannot compel their employees into a combat zone.  
In order to fill PRT positions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, DOS has had to recall retirees  
 
                                                 
154 USAID PRT Assessment Report, 15.  
155 Ibid. 
156 USAID was created by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
 54
 
and hire contractors.  Even though the Public Health Service has commissioned officers, 
they cannot be involuntarily deployed overseas. Short of a legislative fix, there is no real 
solution to the problem.  
Fourth, in reference to legislation, Congress has passed legislation that will 
prohibit civilian agencies from conducting action that make sense.  For example, using 
local vendors and labor makes sense for reconstruction projects.  However, USAID is 
under the guidelines of the 1933 Buy American Act that its reconstruction contracts go to 
American firms.157The consequence is that contracts cost more than if USAID had 
contracted local goods and services.  Former USAID Administrator Brian Atwood said to 
the Washington Post, after leaving the Agency in 1999, that the Buy American 
procurement laws were “the biggest headache I had to deal with.”158  
2. Minimizing the Turbulence of Adhocracy 
The reality is that there will always be an ad hoc nature to how the interagency 
responds to both natural and man-made disasters. Accepting this as a reality, we should 
take steps to minimize those obstacles and disruptions with the CMOC as the PRT.  The 
only requirement for the interagency would be to ensure that it has the right people with 
equipment and access to immediate funds.  I understand this is easier said than done and 
proponents have already suggested this in their reports.  The USAID Assessment Report 
offers two examples: 
PRT access to funds and capabilities needs to be improved to support 
moving the center of effort to the provinces.  USAID needs to [re-open the 
bid process to] the Quick Impact Project (QIP) funding mechanism to 
draw in implementing partners who are able to operate more effectively in 
unstable provinces.  
                                                 
157 Roger Bate, “The Trouble with USAID.” Pre-Publication Copy. The American Interest1. no. 4,  
Summer2006, 115-16.  Available at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24440,filter.all/pub_detail.asp; 
Internet Accessed on May 27, 2007.  Data from USAID’s Buy American Report, the best available 
assessment indicates that over the last decade between 70 and 80 percent of funding appropriations were 
directed to U.S. sources.  In gross terms, the Business Alliance for International Economic Development 
estimated in 1996 that foreign aid sustained 200,000 U.S. domestic jobs. 
158 Ibid. 
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USDA representatives need access to dedicated funding, as should any 
civilian agencies that place representatives on PRTs.159 
The interagency is trying to act upon the above recommendations when it can.  
The Department of State/ Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (DOS/CRS) 
created the Advance Civilian Teams (ACT).  However other agencies need to create 
standing teams as well so that departments do not have to take people “out of hide.”  This 
would help eliminate unpredictable change within departments.  Again, the only 
resolution may be legislative— to enable departments to grow an excess of personnel to 
specifically fill PRTs when needed. 
DoD, DOS, and USAID can also diminish problems that arise from hastily 
formed teams if there is regular training and joint exercises.  Likewise, Joint Forces 
Command, as well as the Regional Combatant Command, must not only make it 
mandatory to have PRTs written into their exercises, but demand that the interagency 
send its people to these exercises.  
E. SELECTING THE RIGHT PRT COMMANDER 
What is your goal as the PRT Commander? – CALL PRT Assessment Team. 
364 days! – Air Force PRT Commander. 
What do you mean by that? – CALL PRT Assessment Team. 
I have 364 days left and then I go home.  That is my goal! 
 – Air Force PRT Commander.160  
Fortunately, the Air Force PRT commander interviewed by the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned team does not reflect the attitude of the majority of PRT commanders.  
However, opponents and proponents alike have lamented the quality of some 
commanders in the field.  As USAID put it: 
The importance of personality, individual leadership style, and previously 
established relationships had inordinate influence on the effectiveness and 
impact of the PRT. In places where PRT commanders worked closely with 
                                                 
159 USAID PRT Assessment Report, 16. 
160 Cahill Interview.  
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the civilian and military team members, the PRT developed as a team with 
a common vision and sense of aligned purpose. In other cases, the PRT 
effort was fragmented.161 
The report continues to lament that some PRT commanders did not include 
representatives from other agencies in the decision making process and did not try to 
integrate civilians into the DoD structure.162  Understanding the importance of the right 
commander, USAID recommended, “Given the importance of PRTs in the USG strategy 
for Afghanistan, PRT commanders need broad operational experience, appropriate past 
assignments, and service school training.”163 
Selection of the PRT commander can make or break the success of the PRT.  PRT 
commanders need to have the right skill sets and need to be trained appropriately to meet 
the complex and demanding nature of the job.  This will only strengthen the attributes of 
a PRT.  Also, PRT commanders need not be civil affairs officers or even military 
officers.  Even though the CMOC is a military organization, civilians are capable of 
being commanders if they have the right skills.  As noted already, regional PRTs in Iraq 
have DOS leaders.  
1. Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Environment  
Because SSTR is a complex operational environment, certain skills are necessary 
for PRT commanders.164  The Defense Advance Research Agency (DARPA) explains in 
detail in a recent request for information (RFI): 
The SSTR/HADR [humanitarian assistance/disaster relief] environment is 
considerably more complex than traditional single-service, joint-service, 
or even coalition operations, in that they typically involve a large, diverse 
mix of military organizations, non-military government organizations, 
regional and international government agencies, (NGOs)…  and the local 
                                                 
161 USAID PRT Assessment Report, 13. 
162 Ibid., 14 
163 Ibid., 15. 
164 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, & 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Office of the Secretary of Defense: November 28, 2005). 
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population… These operations are large-scale… are dynamic, structurally 
and interactively complex…These operations are ad hoc.  These 
operations are cross-domain.  Effective operations require those involved 
to cut across multiple organizations and institutions, fields of expertise, 
and cultures. … These operations have many and diverse actors… with 
diverse skills, orientations, cultures, interests, objectives, and languages.  
These operations require participants to collaborate across domains, 
organizations, cultures, and languages.  Some call this type of 
collaboration, Strategic Collaboration.165  
While collaboration and networking are required for mission success, completion 
of the mission may not come for years because SSTR operations can last for years — if 
not generations.  Given the lack of control PRT commanders will face in the field and, 
with so many different actors in the area of operations with irreconcilable agendas, 
commanders will face “wicked” problems. 
What are wicked problems?  According to Paul Williams: 
• They bridge and permeate jurisdictional, organizational, functional, 
professional, and generational boundaries. 
• They are not amendable to optimal solutions. 
• Finally, this kind of problem does not yield readily to single efforts 
and is beyond the capacity of any one agency or jurisdiction.166 
Military officers, who are taught to solve problems by the end of their short 
rotations, the SSTR environment will require them to cope with wicked problems that 
will not be solved in their tenure. 
2. Civil Affairs Common Skills  
Civil Affairs’ common skills provide a good starting point for qualifications 
needed by a PRT commander, even if that person comes from different military or  
 
 
                                                 
165 Dr. Nancy Roberts, Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School. Lecture, March 5, 2007. 
166 Paul Williams. “The Competent Boundary Spanner,” Public Administration  80, no 1, (2002), 104.  
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civilian background. Civil Affairs personnel are trained to work in an SSTR environment.  
Of the 14 common skills that the Civil Affairs manual lists, 7 should be required for a 
PRT Commander:  
• Civil Information Management. Able to perform using automation 
devices…. to assist in developing the civil inputs to the common 
operational picture.  
• Methods of Instruction. Able to deliver performance-oriented training to 
teach civil/military subjects. 
• Language. [Should at least] have limited ability to express themselves 
within the context of the customs, traditions, and mores of a specific 
culture… 
• Regional Focus and Cultural Awareness. Knowledgeable of regional 
geography, political, social, and economic systems.  Familiar with 
Indigenous Population Institutions and their specific regional religious and 
ethnic differences… 
• Negotiation and Mediation. Able to mediate, negotiate, and facilitate 
interaction across the civil-military spectrum. 
• Project Management. Able to manage projects and programs associated 
with the delivery of effects, including financial management. 
• International Civilian Response. Familiar with the international civilian 
organizations...167 (See Appendix K)  
3. The Boundary Spanner Skill Set 
These skills are critical for military personnel who work with civilians, but 
additional skills are needed when civilians are to be part of an organization that does not 
have control over them.  Mr. Williams believes that interagency success is based on 
individuals — not structural organizations.168  While reorganization helps to handle 
wicked problems, individuals, who have the collaborative skills and mind-sets to resolve 
complex problems, are the key to success in inter-organizational ventures.  What type of 
                                                 
167 FM 3-05.40, 1-7 & 1-8. 
168 Williams, 105-106.  
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individuals can cut across these organizations to accomplish these complex tasks?  Mr. 
Williams describes what a “boundary spanner” is. Here is his profile:  
• Reticulists (or networkers) emphasize the importance of cultivating 
inter-personal relationships, communications, political skills, and an 
appreciation of the interdependencies surrounding the structure of 
problems… [they are seen] as entrepreneurs of power, … especially 
sensitive to and skilled in bridging interests, professions and 
organizations. 
• Entrepreneurs and innovators tend not be amendable to traditional 
or conventional approaches … are flexible … civic entrepreneurs, 
creative, lateral thinking rule-breakers, who frequently combine a 
capacity for visionary thinking with an appetite for opportunism … or 
skilled at coupling problems, policies and politics, particularly 
opportunistically in response to opening policy windows. 
• Otherness is the ability to engage with others and to deploy effective 
relational and interpersonal competencies.  They are motivated to 
acquire an understanding of people and organizations outside their 
own circles. 
• Trust is the most important characteristic of boundary spanners.  
Because of their abilities to accomplish complex problems, people are 
willing to trust the judgment and motives of a boundary spanner. 
• Personality helps define boundary spanners.  They are personable, 
respectful, reliable, tolerant, diplomatic, caring, and committed.  Other 
traits include honesty, commitment, and reliability. 
• Leadership for boundary spanners has been called charismatic or 
catalytic.  They think and act strategically.  Also, they espouse 
interpersonal skills for facilitating a productive, working group or 
network. 
 
With these characteristics, boundary spanners build sustainable relationships by 
communicating and listening, understanding, empathizing, and resolving conflict via 
demonstrating trust worthiness.  They manage through influencing, negotiating, 
networking through complexity, and understanding who is accountable in each 
organization and what motivates them. 
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4. Selection or Training 
A PRT commander can be either a military officer or a civilian with boundary 
spanner characteristics.  The commander must also be personable and demonstrate 
leadership.   
Now that we have the profile of the perfect PRT commander, where would one 
find people who have most of these skills –in or out of the military?   Is it possible to 
teach these skills or is a selection process needed?  I would recommend a selection 
process.  While it may be possible to produce these types of leaders through training, it 
would take years.  However, when PRTs stand up, even with the foundation of CMOC, 
the interagency piece will still be ad hoc.  In this scenario, there is no training time.  
Unfortunately, history shows that when joint civilian teams have been created, it is a long 
time before a training program is created.  The first group of PRT commanders needs to 
be selected for these skill sets. 
This chapter has looked at ways to improve PRTs by building them on the new 
standing CMOC.  This would mitigate the challenges inherent in adhocracy on the 
military side.  The CMOC would not solve the ad hoc nature of the interagency.  
However, the interagency could select personnel for future PRT duty and train them for 
working with the military.   
Also, this chapter has outlined the profile of a PRT commander who possesses the 
right skills.  Once skills are identified, another question remains: Should the skill sets be 
selected or trained?  Until a training and education pipeline is created to produce these 
skill sets and characteristics, a selection process is critical to identifying who already 
possesses these traits 
John Hersey, author of the novel A Bell for Adano, understood that selecting the 
right commander for civil military operations is extremely important.  In fact, he wrote a 
fictional account based on an actual Civil Affairs officer who had a positive effect by 




organizations, specifically with the U.S. Navy.  The fictional character, Major Victor 
Joppolo, understood the importance of civil military operations and was a quintessential 
boundary spanner:   
Therefore, I beg you to get to know this man Joppolo well.  We have need 
of him.  He is our future in the world.  Neither the eloquence of Churchill 
nor the humanness of Roosevelt, no Charter, no four freedoms or fourteen 
points, no dreamer’s diagram so symmetrical and so faultless on paper, no 
plan, no hope, no treaty – none of these things can guarantee anything.  
Only men can guarantee, only the behavior of men under pressure, only 
our Joppolo. 169 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams were created in Afghanistan and Iraq to fill a 
governance and reconstruction gap.  The purpose of PRTs in both locales was to 
strengthen the central government in local areas.  In Afghanistan, the U.S. and ISAF 
PRTs were established to circumvent the problems of the DoD and NATO force cap 
imposed on the operation.  The PRTs were meant as a way to have a small footprint 
(small military force) but have high impact (influence the local population).   
Whether or not the PRTs were successful in this endeavor depends on whom you 
ask.  Many aid workers would say “no” because the PRTs blur the line of humanitarian 
space. They question whether or not PRTs have actually endangered them.   
It is also difficult to determine whether PRTs have been less successful than they 
otherwise could have been given resources, personnel, and training.  However, attributes 
are important: If there are gaps in inputs, it is hard to meet effectiveness goals.  It is 
mandatory that future studies focus on how to assist PRTs to fulfill their potential by 
ensuring such things as quick access to funds, joint training and exercises for future civil-
military teams, and better selection of personnel.   
In the beginning, the primary reason for the lack of resources, personnel, and 
training was the PRT’s ad hoc nature.  As time passed, DoD and other government 
bureaucracies had to adjust their budget cycle to accommodate PRTs.  In the future, to 
avoid forcing PRTs into their budgets, planners should look to the Civil Military 
Operations Center (CMOC), as the foundation for PRTs.  CMOCs are now a standing 
capability built into Civil Affairs Battalions, Civil Affairs Brigades, and Civil Affairs 
Commands.  By being “standing,” these organizations will already be included in the 
DoD budget process and be ready to deploy.  In other words, the CMOC will be funded 
to include resources, personnel, and training.   
The CMOC helps resolve a number of military issues but not the civilian part of 
the PRT challenge.  The ad hoc nature of the civilian side will likely endure.  However, 
with a standing capability already in place on the military side, civilians can fall-in on the 
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military organization.  To help minimize the turbulence of the civilian side, other 
government agencies can ensure that selected personnel for future PRT assignments train 
and exercise with Civil Affairs CMOCs during peacetime. 
In the future, the CMOC will feature one critical attributes that PRTs currently do 
not possess – the civil information management capability.  Addressing this capability 
gap will help generate relevant data to develop quantifiable metrics.  CIM capability also 
addresses other issues, such as continuity as teams rotate in and out of the PRTs.  It also 
can help develop a civil common operating picture to assist commanders to make more 
informed decisions and to help planners adjust future campaigns. 
Something else that should not be overlooked is having commanders with 
boundary spanner skills to operate in complex operations like SSTR.  Whether we 
conduct a selection process for boundary spanners or whether we train to standard is a 
matter of debate.  But what is not debatable is that we cannot produce such individuals 
overnight.  To develop boundary spanners with CA common skills will take training, 
education, and time.  Until an appropriate pipeline can be built, DoD and DOS need to 
select and identify those officers with the right traits and skills for immediate assignment 
when a decision is made to establish a PRT. 
A. FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis, like most others, has raised more questions than it has answered.  
Based on my research, I propose four topics for further study. 
1. Comparative Study of the CORDS Program and PRTs 
Similarities between the CORDS Program and the PRTs are striking.  The 
establishment of the PRTs suffered the same start up problems as the CORDS program.  
CORDS started a year before the Tet Offensive and faced the same type of violence that 
PRTs are facing in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  While CORDS was supposed to be 
civilian led, the military had to support it both logistically and with personnel because it 
was the only organization in the U.S. government capable of doing so.  
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A comparative study should also compare DOS and USAID culture — then and 
now.  Were DOS and USAID Foreign Service Officers in the 1960s more willing to serve 
in a combat zone than they are today?  If they were, what event or events caused the shift 
in attitude?  Also, if the CORDS Program was a great model for civil military teams, why 
was it not institutionalized after the war for future use?   This thesis only scratched the 
surface of the CORDS Program, and an in-depth analysis would provide insights that 
could benefit future PRTs. 
2. An Interagency Command — SSTR 
I suspect the future of PRTs or the civil-military team concept for SSTR is pegged 
to the future of SSTR in general.  The struggle for acceptance by both DoD and DOS is 
reminiscent of the struggle of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the conventional 
services until the creation of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in 1986. SOCOM 
now has its own personnel and training budget, plus its own procurement funds to 
develop SOF-related programs.  Does SSTR need the same thing? 
Such a radical solution would require congressional legislation.  Ideally, an 
Interagency Command for SSTR would have responsibilities equivalent to that of a force 
provider joint command.  This proposed command would have responsibility to train and 
equip personnel designated for work in an SSTR environment, which would include 
PRTs. Military units and interagency personnel would be assigned to the command for 
training and would deploy to a Regional Combatant Command when a SSTR crisis 
develops.  Treated like a joint billet, both DoD and interagency personnel would have to 
serve in the Interagency Command in order to be promoted to Senior Executive Service, 
Senior Foreign Service, or Flag Officer ranks.  Next, like SOCOM, SSTR would have its 
own procurement budget to develop programs specific to SSTR.  
A further study could determine if this is even a viable option by comparing it to 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act which strengthened the Joint Chief of Staff and Regional 
Combatant Commands. 
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3. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as the Foundation for PRTs 
NPS Student MAJ Kenneth J. Burgess is writing his thesis on the Army’s BCT 
design to determine whether its organizational design is optimally suited for SSTR and 
counterinsurgency conflicts.170  His study will determine what organizational changes, if 
any, are needed for the Brigade Combat Team to efficiently perform SSTR task.  
Building on MAJ Burgess’ thesis, could the BCT become the foundation of a 
PRT?  This would resolve two issues: First, one of the complaints out of Iraq and 
Afghanistan is that PRTs do not have enough security to send civil military teams out of 
the compound. The BCT capability would have enough firepower to handle this duty.  
Second, another complaint is that having BCTs and PRTs serving in the same area 
creates stovepipes in with no integration between them.  If the civil component were 
integrated into the BCT, this would guarantee integration.  
4.  Building Cohesive Civil Military Teams 
NPS Student MAJ Glenn Woodson Thesis just completed a study of joint Civil 
Affairs Teams deploying for one year to Iraq.171  These teams combined of Army 
Reservists, Soldiers from the Inactive Ready Reserve, Sailors from the United States 
Navy and Navy Reserve, and Airmen from the United States Air Force.  MAJ Woodson’s 
thesis investigates how to improve ad hoc team’s effectiveness and efficiency.  Building 
on the Army Training Management Cycle developed in Army Field Manual 7-0; he has 
found a better methodology for improving the preparation of ad hoc units by leveraging 
time management throughout the training, validation, and operational phases of 
operations and by linking social, cultural, and task cohesion, units are able to become 
more effective at developing detailed plans to maximize the limited time available to 
train prior to deployment. Using his findings, further research can determine whether this 
model can be used for PRT teams as well.   
                                                 
170 The thesis is called “Organizing for SSTR:  Implications for the Brigade Combat Team.” 
171 The thesis is called “How My Revised Training Model Would Enhance the Effectiveness of 
Otherwise FUBAR Ad Hoc Units.” 
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APPENDIX A: PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN  
(Chronological Order)172 
 











1. Gardez  Paktia 
Lowgar  
East  Jan 2003  U.S.  U.S.   
2. Kunduz  Kunduz 
Takhar  
North  Mar 2003  U.S.  Germany, since 
Dec 2003  
Belgium France 
Hungary Romania 
Switzerland U.S.  
3. Bamian  Bamian  East  Mar 2003  U.S.  New Zealand, 







North  Jul 2003  UK  Sweden, since 




5. Bagram  Parwan 
Kapisa  
East  Nov 2003  U.S.  U.S.  South Korea  
6. Herat  Herat  West  Dec 2003  U.S.  Italy, since Apr 
2005  
France U.S.  
7. Jalalabad  Nangarhar  East  Dec 2003  U.S.  U.S.   
8. Kandahar  Kandahar  South  Dec 2003  U.S.  Canada, since 
Aug 2005  
U.S.  
9. Asadabad  Kunar  East  Feb 2004  U.S.  U.S.   
10. Khowst  Khowst  East  Mar 2004  U.S.  U.S.   
11. Ghazni  Ghazni  East  Mar 2004  U.S.  U.S.   
12. Qalat  Zabul  South  Apr 2004  U.S.  U.S.   
13. Feyzabad  Badakhshan  North  Jul 2004  Germany  Germany  Belgium Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark U.S.  
14. Meymaneh  Faryab  North  Jul 2004  UK  Norway, since 
Sep 2005  
Finland Latvia  




16. Farah  Farah  West  Sep 2004  U.S.  U.S.   
17. Sharan  Paktika  East  Sep 2004  U.S.  U.S.   
18. Tarin Kowt  Uruzgan  South  Sep 2004  U.S.  Netherlands, 
since Aug 2006  
Australia U.S.  
19. Pol-e-
Khomri  
Baghlan  North  Oct 2004  Netherlands  Hungary, since 
Oct 2006  
U.S.  
20. Mehtarlam  Laghman  East  Apr 2005  U.S.  U.S.   
21. Qala-i-Naw  Badghis  West  Jul 2005  Spain  Spain  U.S.  
22. 
Chaghcharan  
Ghowr  West  Aug 2005  Lithuania  Lithuania  Croatia Denmark 
Iceland U.S.  
                                                 
172  ISAF PRT Handbook, D-3-2. 
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23. Panjshir  Panjshir  East  Oct 2005  U.S.  U.S.   
24. Kala Gush  Nurestan  East  Nov 2006  U.S.  U.S.   
25. Vardak  Vardak  East  Nov 2006  Turkey  Turkey   
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APPENDIX B: PRT LOCATIONS IN IRAQ  
(Does not include Embed PRTs)173 
 
Province PRT Location Nearest City Status 




(REO) Al Hillah 
Al Hillah Established 




Compound Al Basrah Established 
Dhi Qar 
(Italian) Camp Adder An Nasiryah Operating 
Diyala FOB Warhorse Baquba Established 
Dahuk Camp Zaytun Erbil To be determined (TBD) 
Erbil  
(South Korea) Camp Zaytun Erbil TBD 
Karbala REO Al Hillah Al Hillah At REO Al Hillah 
Kirkuk REO Kirkuk/ FOB Warrior Kirkuk Established 
Maysan Camp Adder Al Nasiryah TBD 
Muthanna Camp Adder Al Nasiryah TBD 
Najaf REO Al Hillah Al Hillah At REO  Al Hillah 
Ninewa FOB Marez Mosul Established 
Qadisiyah REO Al Hillah Al Hillah At REO  Al Hillah 
Salah ad Din Camp Speicher Tikrit Established 
Sulaymaniyah Camp Zaytun Erbil TBD 
Wasit REO Al Hillah Al Hillah At REO  Al Hillah 
                                                 
173 CALL PRT Iraq Handbook, 5. 
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APPENDIX C: THE CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS) PROGRAM 
A. RELEVANCE 
As a historical example of effective civil military teams, PRTs are commonly 
compared to the CORDS program.  They are compared, too, in terms of measure of 
effectiveness.  In his recommendations regarding PRTs, Robert Perito refers to the 
CORDS program:  
 
Much could be achieved if the military component of the PRT was matched with 
a robust staff of civilian personnel.  The Civil Operations and Rural Development 
Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam might provide a model for such a 
program. CORDS was an integrated civilian-military organization, but USAID 
was the lead agency and its personnel were overwhelmingly civilian.  Even in the 
hotly contested I Corps area of Vietnam, only 750 of 2,000 CORDS personnel 
were military.  The State Department assigned several hundred FSOs to serve on 
CORDS Provincial and District Advisory Teams, according to a veteran FSO 
who served in CORDS and in a PRT in Afghanistan.  These officers received 
four to six months of Vietnamese language and area training prior to eighteen-
month to two-year assignments.  CORDS received funding for development 
assistance and was provided its own transport and logistical support.  CORDS 
was developed when it became apparent that U.S. military operations were 
alienating the rural population they were trying to protect.174 
 
Unfortunately, with 30 years of hindsight, only the positive aspects of the 
program are remembered.  While today the CORDS program offers an interesting civil-
military concept, the program itself reveals that it suffered the same start up problems 
that PRTs faced.  The CORDS program matured over time and accomplished great 
things, but the final verdict was, as with the PRTs, also mixed.   
                                                 
174 Robert M. Perito. “Special Report: The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan: Lessons Identified,” United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC: October 2005), 14. 
Available at http://www.usip.org.  
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The CORDS program was created in 1967 to merge all of the military and other 
government agencies (CIA, USAID, USIA) and pacification programs under one office.  
They included the CIA’s Revolutionary Development (RD) program which operated 
under the Vietnamese Army; USAID’s New Life Development Program and Police Field 
Force; the Army’s Mobility Advisory Teams MATs; and other various programs.175  
President Johnston appointed Robert W. Komer with Ambassador Rank as the Deputy to 
Military Advisory Command – Vietnam (MACV) which gave him coequal status with all 
of General Westmoreland’s staff.176 
CORDS’ organizational structure, “…was a unique experiment in a unified civil/ 
military field advisory and support organization, quite different from World War II civil 
affairs or military government.”177  The hierarchy would be a mix of civilians and 
soldiers who reported to each other.  Separate chain of commands disappeared: 
Soldiers served directly under civilians, and vice versa, at all levels.  They 
wrote each other’s efficiency reports.  Personnel were drawn from all the 
military services, and from State, AID, CIA, USIA, and the White House.  
But CORDS was fully integrated into the theater military structure.  The 
Deputy for CORDS served directly under General Westmoreland and later 
General Abrams to support him, a MACV general staff section was 
created under a civilian assistant chief of staff with a general officer 
deputy.  Four regional deputies for CORDS served under the U.S. corps 
level commanders.  The cutting edge was unified civil-military advisory 
teams in all 250 districts and 44 provinces.178  
C. NOTABLE FEATURES 
John A. Nagl wrote, “CORDS encouraged innovation from its personnel as a primary 
facet of its developing organization organizational culture, creating or improving:”   
                                                 
175 Surprisingly, the USMC Combine Arms Platoons (CAP) and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group 
(CIDG) were not under the CORDS program.  An interesting account of a person’s involvement in the 
Army MAT program, read David Donovan’s Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam 
(New York: Ballantine Book, 1986), 32. 
176 Andrew F. Krepinevich The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 217. 
177 Robert W. Kromer. Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1986), 119. 
178 Ibid. 
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a) A series of new measurement systems designed primarily for management 
purposes 
b) The “Chieu Hoi” defector program 
c) 59- man RD teams associated village self-development programs 
d) The GVN National training Center at Vung Tau 
e) A new Vietnam training center in Washington to train CORDS advisors 
f) The GVN Phung Hoang program, an ambitious effort to destroy Viet Cong 
infrastructure by any means necessary, known as “Phoenix” to Americans 
g) The CORDS Evaluation Branch to provide accurate reports of conditions in the 
field to top management 
h) The People’s Self-Defense forces, created after 1968 Tet Offensive 179 
D. ISSUES WITH THE CORDS PROGRAM 
Even though much innovation was credited to CORDS’ lack of 
bureaucratic history and culture, this also proved a major obstacle to obtaining 
material and funds.  Komer writes, “Generating an adequate management 
structure on the GVN side was much more difficult, since what needed to be 
pulled together was not just modest U.S. advisory and support effort but major 
administrative and operational programs.”180  
Similar to the PRTs, CORDS should have been established and run by 
DOS or some other government agency.  However, just with PRT start-up 
problems in Iraq, it was placed under the military because “…if you are going to 
get a program going, you are only going to be able to do it by stealing from the 
military.  They have all the trucks, they have all the planes, they have all the 
people, they have all the money.”181  
E. FINAL ASSESSMENT  
Komer rated the success of the CORDS program “…at best only a 
qualified success.”  The flaws and weaknesses of the program were indicative of 
                                                 
179 John A. Nagl. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 165.   
180 Komer, 120.  My literature search did not establish how long it took to establish the CORDS 
program. I figured that it took three to four years to mature and to get trained personnel from the U.S. to fill 
all of the required billets in the country. 
181 Krepinevich, 217. 
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how the U.S. approached Vietnam.  First, from a management point of view, 
Washington ran the war as a peacetime management structure as opposed to crisis 
management.182  This created a lack of unified management between Saigon and 
Washington, DC.  Another problem was that the U.S. military did not take 
pacification seriously as a primary task or incorporate it into the institution at 
large.  One senior officer statement sums up why CORDS was a limited success 
and why the military never tried to institute the concept, “I’ll be damned if I 
permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be 
destroyed just to win this lousy war.”183   
                                                 
182 Komer, 86. 
183 Nagl, 172. 
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APPENDIX D: SELECTED PRT MODELS 
1. PRT PARWAN OR BAGRAM (2005–2006)184 
Purpose
Our purpose is to conduct civil-military operations in 
Parwan and Kapisa Provinces in order to extend the 
reach and legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan 
by:
 Promoting good governance and justice
 Enabling an effective Afghan security apparatus 
through training and mentorship
 Facilitating reconstruction, development, and 
economic growth
Ultimately creating the conditions for self-sufficiency, 




     
 
                                                 









Y Al Qaida and Associated Movements Defeated in Operational Area
CFC-A’s Posture Reshaped for the Long War



































Economic growth facilitated by Infrastructure 
and Reconstruction Development
Security Cooperation with Pakistan Enhanced
GoA able to execute long-term CN program, 
based on an effective law enforcement system, 
with limited support from International Community
GoA able to execute long-term CN program, 
complemented by credible economic measures, 












Stable and representative government and 
independent Judicial System established
STABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY
CFC-A Lines of Operation
 
 











Create a moderate, stable, and representative Afghanistan capable of 




2. PRT JALALABAD (FALL 2004 – SUMMER 2005)185 
 
1
PRT Jalalabad conducts civil-military 
operations in Nangarhar Province IOT 
facilitate reconstruction & development, 
enable the democratically elected Afghan 
Government, and create the conditions for 








• Enable an effective Afghan security 
apparatus
• Facilitate and coordinate reconstruction 
and development
• Extend the reach of the central 
government
• Support the election / post election 
 
                                                 






































Civil Military Activities 
Balanced portfolio












• Fruit tree orchard
Challenges:
• Reach-back expertise










• DDR:  1st Corp DDR’d 5 Feb 05
• Excellent Rapport with Local Leadership
• Synch of PRT activities 
• Build on Nat’l Elections Momentum 
Challenges:
• Information Sharing (Higher to Lower) 
• Land Disputes
• Counternarcotics production, smuggling, operations 






USAID-led / Afghanistan sub-office replaces PRT
Or
PRT “taken over by coalition”
Conditions: 
• Minimal terrorism activity
• Stable, elected, functioning government
• Rule of law
• Sustained economic growth
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APPENDIX E: ISAF/NATO PRT MISSION  
PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES 
A. The PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) published PRT mission statement 
and guidelines on January 27, 2005.  The following text comes from ISAF/NATO’s 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Handbook: 
 
“Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the 
development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of 
operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction 
efforts.”186 
 
B. The ESC also published guidelines that all PRTs should follow: 
• Focus upon improving stability.  
• Operate as an integrated military-civilian organization. 
• Work to a common purpose or endstate with unity of effort. 
• Lead from behind and underneath, ensuring Afghan ownership. Promote 
Afghan primacy and legitimacy. 
• Actively engage with the Governor, GoA officials, the local communities 
and population through Provincial Councils, Provincial Development 
Committees, Shuras and other established and traditional bodies. 
• Facilitate the visibility of GoA presence in the province by assisting 
official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transport, 
communications, etc.). 
• Promise ONLY what can be delivered; manage expectations. 
• Engage in programs or projects which the PRT rotation can complete or 
hand-over. 
                                                 
186 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Handbook Vol I & II, Version 3. International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF)/ NATO/ UNMA. (Kabul, Afghanistan: February 3, 2007), 2.  
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• Sustainability must be “planned in” at the outset. 
• Ensure that projects do not duplicate the work of others.  
• Ensure that interventions at provincial level support national GoA 
processes...  
• Lay the foundations for long-term sustainable changes. 
• Be committed to consulting and/or working with international partners, 
such as UNAMA, IOs and NGOs. 
• Be aware and respectful of civil military sensitivities - lives may depend 
on it.  
• Have a finite lifespan, linked to an endstate of improved stability.187 
                                                 
187Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 3. 
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APPENDIX F: DOS PRT - IRAQ188 
PRT Mission Statement
To assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing 
a transparent and sustained capability to govern, 
promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting 
political and economic development, and providing 
provincial administration necessary to meet the basic 




Train, coach and mentor provincial governments entities, in order to 
develop their capacity to:
¾ Develop core competencies of provincial governments;
¾ Establish effective provincial linkages with ministries and central government;
¾ Plan and prioritize provincial government direction and activities; 
¾ Prepare budgets, identify funding needs, and develop fiscal responsibility;
¾ Determine government staffing requirements and address these via
government code;
¾ Plan and coordinate civil construction and development activities, and 
coordinate support by Iraqi national and local government resources, donors, 
NGOs and private capital investment;
¾ Communicate with constituents via effective public affairs initiatives;
¾ Provide and enhance the delivery of provincial and municipal services;
¾ Develop by-laws and effective committee structures;
¾ Conduct local elections using uniformly applied model elections ordinance.





                                                 





Transition to Self Reliance
1st Phase 2nd Phase 3rd Phase
USAID
4th Phase









PRT Concept of Operations
 Design Intent of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).
¾ Modular in nature, w/standard core structure that is tailored to each province
¾ Reliant on in-place REO & FOB support for housing, administration, logistics, and 
security, where available; but has organic personnel movement security, 
communications, transportation, etc.
¾ Utilizes existing PST assets; augmented with military resources (personnel, security, 
transportation, communications).
¾ Absorbs current SET and designated REO personnel and assets into PRTs.
¾ Built-in flexibility to “outlive” current REO and MNF-I positioning.
 Overall DOS Program Lead. PRT Team Leader responsible for all facets of initiative in the 
province, to include political liaison, governance development, reconstruction & 
assistance, etc.
¾ PRT subordinate to National Coordination Team; team elements and members under 
authority (TACON) of Team Leader (US/Coalition civilian or MNF-I Officer).
¾ Deputy Team Leader CF military officer (or USG/Coalition civilian, if TL military officer).
¾ Coordinates with MNF-I, AmEmb and Coalition Diplomatic Missions for asset allocation,
logistical and administrative support, strategic guidance, etc.








¾ Overall responsibility for management of PRT; reports to Regional Coordinator.
¾ Assesses, tasks, & prioritizes work of PRT. 
¾ Liaises with senior provincial leadership, Regional Coordinator, National Coordination Team. 
Deputy Team Leader
¾ Manages day-to-day operations and security of PRT.
¾ Monitors intelligence reporting and coordinates with RSO, RROC and other security elements.
¾ Focal point for PRT reporting (SITREPS, etc.).
Civil Affairs Company (-)
¾ Develops assessments of governance, infrastructure and provincial needs.
¾ Provides limited subject matter experts (gov, econ, education, public works, energy)
¾ Coordinates Civil Affairs activities with MSC. 
IRMO Provincial Program Manager
¾ Provides oversight and deconfliction of USG reconstruction efforts.
¾ Coordinates, liaises, coaches & mentors provincial reconstruction and development committee 
members in all phases of project execution.
Iraq Provincial Action Officer
¾ Interfaces with local officials and private citizens in support of PRT initiatives.
¾ Advocates US policy as PRT public affairs action officer.




¾ Coordinates USAID efforts with PRT and provincial leaders.
¾ Trains, coaches, liaises w/ provincial leaders regarding USAID support and training of provincial 
leadership.
MSC (Major Subordinate Command) Liaison Officer (LNO)
¾ Coordinates PRT activities with MSC
¾ Route security, communication, emergency/contingency planning, ISF LNO.
¾ Coordinates PRT activities with P3 and PJCC programs. 
Engineer Officer
¾ Trains, coaches, mentors Iraqi counterparts on project development, engineering assessments, scopes of 
work, quality assurance and quality control, construction processes,  and project administrative 
considerations.
¾ Works with IRMO PPM for coordination of CERP and IRRF project oversight.
¾ Provides link with SROC, RROC and ROC.
Local Governance Team/Functional Team
¾ Core members provide training and mentoring of core governmental functions: public administration, 
public finance and budgeting, and urban/municipal planning.
¾ Other members provide training and mentoring in functional areas specific to each province, to include: 
public safety, health, economics and commerce, education, tourism, agriculture, public transportation, 
public communications, public affairs, rule of law, energy, and public works .
Rule of Law Coordinator
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APPENDIX G: EMBED PRTS – IRAQ189 
A. CONCEPT: 
• Combined with local policing effort (Joint Security Stations) 
• Integrated directly into Brigade Combat Teams in Baghdad (6 total) and Al Anbar 
Province (3 total) 
• DOS Team Lead equal in status to BCT commander in matters of reconstruction 
• Ad hoc organization 
 True functional specialists assigned by district 
 Based on skills versus rank or origin (DoD → DOS) 
 Requirements are bottom up vice top down 
 
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: 
• Goal:  Improve on Regional Embassy Office (REO) and Provincial Support Team 
(PST) programs. 
• Implementation:   Integrated capacity-building effort built around Local 
Governance Program (LGP) 
 
C. COMPOSITION: 
• Team Lead: Department of State 
• Deputy Team Leader: Department of Defense 
• Function Specialists:  USAID, USDA, USDOJ 
• Civil Reconnaissance:  Civil Affairs Company 
• Security:  Military Brigade Combat Team 
 
D. TIMELINE: 
• Phase I: Leadership by 31 Mar 07 
• Phase II: Function Experts by 30 Jun 07 
• Phase III: Augment and Expand Stand Alone PRTs by 31 Dec 07 
                                                 
189 Woodson. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: An Oral Interview.”   
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APPENDIX H: THE GENEVA AND THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS 
A. CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF 
WAR ON LAND, THE HAGUE II (July 29, 1899) 
 
The Hague Convention is “… animated by the desire to serve, even in this 
extreme hypothesis, the interest of humanity and the ever increasing requirements of 
civilization.”  The document covers the moral obligation in Section III, “On Military 
Authority Over Hostile Territory,” articles 42–56.  However, articles 43, 53, 55, and 56 
sum up the PCR responsibilities of the military: 
Article 43: The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of 
the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country. 
Article 53:  An army of occupation can only take possession of the cash, funds, and 
property liable to requisition belonging strictly to the State, depots of arms, means 
of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property of the State 
which may be used for military operations ... they must be restored at the 
conclusion of peace, and indemnities paid for them. 
Article 55: The occupying State shall only be regarded as administrator and usufructuary 
of the public buildings, real property, forests, and agricultural works belonging to 
the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must protect the capital 
of these properties, and administer it according to the rules of usufruct. 
Article 56: The property of the communes, that of religious, charitable, and educational 
institutions, and those of arts and science, even when State property, shall be 
treated as private property. 
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B. THE CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (THE FOURTH GENEVA 
CONVENTION) (AUGUST 12, 1949) 
 
The Fourth Geneva Conventions Section III, article 59 best sums up the military 
obligation in an occupied territory: 
If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, 
the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said 
population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. 
 
Also, Section III, “Occupied Territories,” that covers other areas, such as children, 
women, protection of workers, prohibited destruction, food and medical supplies for the 
population, hygiene and public health, and collective relief. 
Article 51: The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in 
its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing 
voluntary enlistment is permitted. 
The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to work unless they are 
over eighteen years of age, and then only on work which is necessary either for 
the needs of the army of occupation, or for the public utility services, or for the 
feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health of the population of the 
occupied country. Protected persons may not be compelled to undertake any work 
which would involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations. 
The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to employ forcible 
means to ensure the security of the installations where they are performing 
compulsory labor. 
The work shall be carried out only in the occupied territory where the persons 
whose services have been requisitioned are. Every such person shall, so far as 
possible, be kept in his usual place of employment. Workers shall be paid a fair 
wage and the work shall be proportionate to their physical and intellectual 
capacities. The legislation in force in the occupied country concerning working 




of work, equipment, preliminary training and compensation for occupational 
accidents and diseases, shall be applicable to the protected persons assigned to the 
work referred to in this Article. 
Article 52: No contract, agreement or regulation shall impair the right of any 
worker, whether voluntary or not and wherever he may be, to apply to the 
representatives of the Protecting Power in order to request the said Power’s 
intervention. 
Article 53: Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property 
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to 
other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, 
except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations. 
Article 55: To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power 
has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it 
should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other 
articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate. The Occupying 
Power may not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical occupation forces and 
administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian 
population have been taken into account. Subject to the provisions of other 
international Conventions, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements to 
ensure that fair value is paid for any requisitioned goods. The Protecting Power 
shall, at any time, be at liberty to verify the state of the food and medical supplies 
in occupied territories, except where temporary restrictions are made necessary by 
imperative military requirements. 
Article 56: To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the public Occupying 
Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national 
and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public 
health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the 
adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to 
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combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all 
categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties. 
Article 58: The Occupying Power shall permit ministers of religion to give 
spiritual assistance to the members of their religious communities. 
Article 62: Subject to imperative reasons of security, protected persons in 
occupied territories shall be permitted to receive the individual relief 
consignments sent to them. 
ANNEX I: Draft Agreement Relating to Hospital and Safety Zones and Localities 
Article 1: Hospital and safety zones shall be strictly reserved for the persons 
mentioned in Article 23 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 
1949, and in Article 14 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, and for the personnel 
entrusted with the organization and administration of these zones and localities, 
and with the care of the persons therein assembled. 
Article 12: In the case of occupation of a territory, the hospital and safety zones 
therein shall continue to be respected and utilized as such. 
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APPENDIX I: SUGGESTED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
(MOES)  
A. Save the Children (UK) suggested Security Metrics190 
 
 
Activity  Suggested measures of effectiveness (MoEs)  
Suggested indicators/data 
sources  
Security  Changes in humanitarian 
security  
Attacks on humanitarian workers 
(Source: ANSO) Humanitarian 
access  
 Changes in overall 
security environment  
Swisspeace FAST Reports  
 Inter-militia intervention 
rate  
Percentage of known inter-militia 
disputes in which PRT intervened  
 Inter-militia mediation 
success rate  
Percentage of inter-militia 
disputes (in which PRT 
intervened) that were successfully 
mediated/resolved  
 Reduction in levels of 
lawlessness/banditry  
Reported incidents of banditry  
 Changes in land area 
under poppy cultivation in 
a specific region  
Land area under cultivation 
[hectares]  
 People’s ambient security 
expectations (including in 
returnee areas)  
Surveys of public opinion on 
perceptions of security (should not 
be undertaken by military)  
 Number of ANP 
personnel/ trainees that 
can be supported by PRT 





Increased acceptance of 
military’s mission  
Views expressed by local 
community members of military’s 
mission and role (interviews 
should not be undertaken by 
military)  
 Improved co-operation 
between military and local 
population  
Number of engagements by local 
community representatives with 
military in liaison capacity  
                                                 
190 Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian – Military relations in Afghanistan. Save the 
Children (UK) (London: 2004), 38-39.  
 94
 Force protection  Security intelligence on PRTs 
provided directly by members of 
the local community  
Reconstruction  Support to road network 
construction  
Km road/year (with reference to 
any government targets) Use of 
roads  
 Local employment in 
PRT-funded 
reconstruction projects  
Number of workers (full/part-
time) Employee salaries compared 
to local salaries 
Activity  
 
Suggested measures of 
effectiveness (MoEs) Suggested indicators/data sources  
 Component of 
reconstruction needs (per 
province) addressed by 
PRT activities  
Comparison of needs (from 
‘Securing Afghanistan’s Future’) 
and PRT activities  
 Construction of facilities 
directly or under contract 
from PRT to support 
deployment of ANP (eg, 
police stations)  
New/refurbished facilities 
(possibly measured by square 





Relative authority of central 
government in PRT 
catchment area  
Qualitative data: who collects 
‘taxes’/customs duties? Who 
provides security?  
 Physical infrastructure 
available to support  
Offices are staffed and functioning  
 Support by PRT to local 
government councils 
Number of functioning local 
government bodies supported by PRT 
Relief 
Operations  
Note: focuses only on delivery of relief supplies in areas where 
NGHAs are unable to operate, or ‘exceptional circumstances’  
 Relief delivered in specific 
sectors, according to verified 
need (eg, health; food and 
nutrition; water and 
sanitation; and education 
sectors) 




B. NCT’s Measuring Progress/ Success for the Province191 
The National Coordination Center conducts a monthly assessment of progress 
within each province.  There are four phases of progress, and the majority of the PRTs 
fall somewhere between Phase I and Phase II.  The transition between phases is based on 
functional assessment, not time. 
 
Phase I:  Generally a non-permissive environment where the local provincial 
government is struggling to create a functioning administrative structure in order to 
provide for the basic needs of the populace.  Heavy emphasis is placed on the basic role 
of the governor, PC … and other key government functionaries.  Providing basic needs 
will be problematic and often is beyond the means of the local government.  Civil society 
organizations are rare and often not functioning correctly.  Schools tend to be 
understaffed and ill resourced. 
 
Phase II:  A more secure, but still non-permissive environment where increased 
movement is possible.  Key government players understand their roles and what needs to 
be done, but lack the technical knowledge or will to accomplish their goals.  Basic needs 
of the population for food, water, and shelter are generally met, but significant shortages 
exist in electricity, fuel, and other requirements for normal commerce.  Civil 
organizations are established and function with the help from non-Iraqi government 
sources.  The majority of children attends and graduates from elementary school. 
 
Phase III:  A semi-permissive environment that allows reduced security measures 
including a minimal military presence.  Provincial government officials are trying to 
stand on their own but still require occasional assistance or “course corrections” from the 
LGP.  Basic needs and services are generally met to allow for normal economic and 
living standards.  Civil society organizations branch out into community and charitable 
                                                 
191 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq Tactics, Techniques & Procedures Handbook, Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL), No 07-11 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: January 2007 (Draft), 18.  
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groups.  The vast majority of children attend school and many graduate from high school.  
Trade and vocational schools create a significant number of skilled workers. 
 
Phase IV:  Generally a permissive environment, although pockets of “trouble areas” may 
still exist.  The provincial government functions acceptably, and the LGP effort 
concentrates on subprovincial government organizations such as city or tribal leaders.  
Basic needs and services are regular and allow good economic function.  A service 
industry begins to develop.  Civil society organizations contribute heavily to the daily 
function of society and provide a basic safety net for the underclass.  A significant 
portion of the population graduates from high school; some go on to the university. 
C. Methodology Definitions from USIP’s Metric Framework for Assessing 
Conflict Transformation and Stabilization (May, 2007) (Draft)192 
 
1.  Content analysis (CA):193 Involves surveying media publications in order to gauge 
popular and/or elite impressions of an issue. 
 
Advantages:  Relies on readily available publications; newspapers, in particular, 
can be important shapers of public opinion. 
 
Disadvantages:  Difficult to choose which publications to survey; Labor intensive 
process of conducting the analysis. 
 
2.  Expert opinion (EO): Entails creating a panel of independent, knowledgeable, and 
experienced experts to assess an issue of interest (e.g., the capacity of law enforcement 
agencies to perform essential administrative and bureaucratic functions). In this case, a 
panel of 3-5 experts might be used observe operations in the field and to report on their 
quality. The reliability and replicability of the findings depend on specifying the 
evaluation criteria and data gathering methodology in advance and following them 
consistently in the field. 
 
                                                 
192 USIP. 
193 The Fund for Peace’s Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) uses content analysis to assess 
the degree to which drivers of conflict improve or worsen as well as to determine the strength of key 
institutions (based on three criteria: legitimacy, representativeness and professionalism). CAST scans data 
from over 11,000 sources (including reports from the media, government and NGOs). CAST currently 
evaluates a number of rule of law and human rights areas, including the degree of criminalization and 
corruption of the state and evaluations of the domestic police force, corrections system, and judicial system. 
CAST can be used for countrywide or province-level analysis.  
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Advantages: Experts have the knowledge and expertise to offer informed and useful 
opinions on a situation and can make sound qualitative judgments in a relatively 
short period. They may be used to study program documents, interviews 
participants, and make observations in the field. The major costs involved are 
salaries and travel rather than complicated data-collection procedures. 
 
Disadvantages: Experts may have political agendas to advance; one needs to be 
wary of relying on a biased sample of experts. It is especially important that the 
panelists be capable of independent judgment. They cannot be permanent 
employees of the contracting agency or have a financial stake in the future of the 
program being evaluated.  
 
3.  Statistical Analysis (SA): Utilizes a variety of statistics about security, standard of 
living, and economic development to assess the situation in a country. 
  
 Advantages:  Statistics can appear to be a more objective way of assessing 
 progress; Provide a useful standard for comparing progress at two different times. 
 
Disadvantages:  Can be difficult to locate reliable indicators of the larger issue one 
is assessing—for example, some have argued that number of deaths per month 
alone is not a particularly good indicator of the strength of the insurgency in Iraq; 
Statistics are easily manipulated to accommodate a variety of interpretations. 
 
4.  Survey/Polling Data (S/PD): Involves conducting public opinion surveys in order 
to assess how the public views a variety of issues. 
 
Advantages:  Can provide useful general overview of societal views and values; 
can easily be conducted on a large number of people, which provides more 
confidence in the findings. 
 
Disadvantages:  Surveys must be carefully designed to ensure that the sampled 
public is representative; Poorly worded questions or untrained survey conductors 
can lead to inaccurate responses. 
 98
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 99
APPENDIX J: HISTORY OF THE CMOC 
A. WHAT’S IN A NAME 
PRT activities in the past were conducted through Civil Military Operation 
Centers.  Even though the term CMOC did not become doctrinal until the 1993 update of 
FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, the Army has been conducting them since World 
War II.  Civil Affairs and CMO literature reveals that current PRT activities were 
executed by Army Civil Affairs through various ad hoc organization to support a full 
spectrum of operations from military occupation to counterinsurgency.   
In the Pulitzer Prize Winning book, A Bell for Adano, the fictional character, 
Major Victor Joppolo, conducts CMOC tasks out of his Civil Affairs/ Military 
Government (CA/MG) Headquarters in a converted city hall.194  If he had interagency 
people in it, he would have had a PRT.  In Military/Government Journal: Normandy to 
Berlin, Major General John J. Maginnis, recounts his experience as a CA/MG Officer 
across Northern Europe.  In each city, he set up a CA/MG headquarters and conducted 
CMOC tasks.  The editor comments that he was surprised how many diplomatic activities 
that CA/MG officers conducted with allies, civilian administrators, private citizens, and 
resistance fighters.195  World War II was not the exception. CMOC activities supported 
other major combat operations, counterinsurgencies, peace operations, SSTR, and natural 
disasters.  In numerous situations CMOCs became the natural hub for civil military 
activity.   
What surprised me after a limited literature review was that it took more than 50 
years for the Army or the Civil Affairs community to standardize the name.  As late as 
2000, FM 41-10 still admitted that a “…CMOC can also have a variety of names, depending 
on the level of command or organization and the region of the world that establishes it.”196 I 
was also surprised how long it took the Army to make a CMOC a standing capability 
                                                 
194 John Hersey.  A Bell for Adano (New York: Vintage Book, 1988), 8. 
195 MG John J. Maginnis. Military Government Journal:  Normandy to Berlin (Amherst, MA: 
UMASS Press, 1971), Forward. 
196 Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
February 2000), H-1.  
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given the number of times it had to stand one up.  As late as 2001, Joint Civil Affairs 
doctrine still defined a CMOC as “…an ad hoc organization, normally established by the 
geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, or other commanders to assist in the 
coordination of activities of participating military forces, and other USG agencies, 
nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations.197 
With this in mind, it should be no surprise that PRTs started and will continue to 
be ad hoc organizations and will probably be dubbed as something else in the future such 
as Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) or Forward Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs).  If 
this happened, it would not be without precedence.  I have listed all of the names that I 
have come across in a limited CA/ CMO literature review: 
 
Civil Affairs/Military Government Headquarters (AMGOT) conducted 
CMOC activities in both liberated and occupied territories.  They were ad hoc 
organizations that operated separately from the G-5 staff section of a division or 
higher headquarters.  Sometimes these headquarters reported directly to DOS in 
friendly territories. 
  
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) 
Program was an ad hoc combination of civil military teams (DOS and DoD) that 
operated under MACV.  This newly formed agency sought to pacify the 
population of South Vietnam. The interagency teams provided millions of dollars 
of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to the population to win their 
loyalty (i.e., “hearts and minds”).  CORDS also trained local militias to protect 
their villages from the Viet Cong.198 
 
The Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF) was an ad hoc organization which 
supported the Panama invasion and conducted CMO throughout the country.   
 
 
                                                 
197 Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
April 14, 2003), XI. 
198 Komer, 118-21. 
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CATF belonged to SOUTHCOM before it was moved to the CJCMOTF which 
was under the control of the U.S. Ambassador. The CATF would later be used in 
both Kuwait and Northern Iraq.199 
 
Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF) was an ad hoc interagency organization created 
during Desert Shield/Storm.  The core organization was the 352 Civil Affairs 
Command with interagency elements attached.  The purpose of the KTF was 
to plan the post-conflict reconstruction of Kuwait with the government in 
exile.200 
 
Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) was a compromise ad hoc 
organization created by the CENTCOM Commander and the U.S. Ambassador of 
Kuwait.  It combined the 352 CA CMD and the KTF to execute the 
reconstruction of post-conflict Kuwait.  The CCATF included interagency, 
coalition partners, some NGOs, and the Kuwaiti government in exile.201 
 
CIMIC House was a NATO term for CMOCs that were set up in towns and 
villages across Bosnia and Kosovo.  The Americans adopted the term in both 
operations and set up similar organizations that mirrored those of other NATO 
countries.202 
 
Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) is a joint task force 
specifically designed for a stability operations environment.  Although, it is a 
Civil Affairs-centric organization, it does not have to be as demonstrated in the 
first year in Afghanistan.203 
 
                                                 
199 John T. Fishel. Civil Military Operations in the New World (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). 86. 
200 Stanley Sandler. Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil 
Affairs and Military Government (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC Press, 1994). 
201 Fishel, 161-62. 
202 When I was a Civil Affairs Team leader in Bosnia, we interacted with the CIMIC House in Tuzla 
on a monthly basis. 
203 Joint Publication 3-57.1, xi. 
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Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) has been used in 
operations with HA-centric operations.  In Iraq HACCs operated at the 
operational level whereas CMOCs operated at the tactical level.  Also, HACCs 
operated in adjacent countries to Iraq such as HACC - Jordan and HACC – 
Kuwait.  HACC remains a joint term but was not included in FM 3-05.40.204 
 
Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) is designed to be the primary 
coordinator at the strategic level.  During Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), a 
HOC was set up in Kuwait to conduct IO/ NGO facilitation and coordination.  It 
was designed to have interagency participation to include USAID DARTs but 
they never joined.  While the HOC was established by CFLCC, the Kuwaiti 
government assumed control of it.  Once Iraq fell and the IAC was set up in 
Baghdad, the HOC downgraded to a HACC.205 
 
Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) were established in 
Afghanistan and in the neighboring countries of Uzbekistan and Pakistan.  The 
name replaced CMOC as a way for Civil Affairs Teams (CATs) to interface with 
the IO/NGO community without stigma.  Later, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison 
Cells would build quick impact projects across Afghanistan.  The interagency 
was never formally part of these ad hoc organizations. However, informally 
USAID kept OTI teams associated with them for long term fieldwork. 
 
Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC) is another term to describe 
CMOC activities.  422nd Civil Battalion named its CMOC in Baghdad a CMCC.  
This term made it to the 2000 FM 41-10 update but disappeared in FM 3-
05.40.206 
 
                                                 
204 Joint Publication 3-57.1, x. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Field Manual 41-10 (2000), H-1. 
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Governorate Support Teams (GST) were ad hoc civil military teams set up in 
the first year of OIF.  When the CPA dissolved so did the GSTs.  Some of the 
concepts made it into DOS PRTs. 
 
Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC) was originally planned as an ad hoc interagency 
organization under the control of ORHA/ CPA in Baghdad.  The plan was to 
have a majority of DOS and Iraqi Ministry personnel.  When the transfer never 
happened, and the CPA never staffed the organization, it became a coalition 
military and Iraqi civilian hybrid organization. 
 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are ad hoc Civil-Military Teams 
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APPENDIX K: CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE DOCUMENT UPDATES207 
Plug and Play:  Army Transformation created module sections in units.  This mean these 
units can be added or subtracted to other units determined by mission. 
A. CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY 
Civil Affairs Company
Supports Maneuver Brigade
CMOC facilitates Civil Engagement / 
Interagency Coordinations
CA Teams support Battalions / CMOC
Focus – Tactical / Local;
- Civil Reconnaissance
- Key Civil Leader Engagement
- Local Project Coordination
Proposed design ADDS:
- 4th Company to CA Battalions
- CMOC for each Company







B. CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION 
Civil Affairs Battalion
Supports Unit of Employment X (UEx) / Division
CMOC facilitates Civil Engagement / Interagency Coordination / Civil Information Fusion
Civil Liaison Team – CA Teams for the CMOC, ‘Store front’, Engagement Assets
Civil Information Management Cell – Collates/ fuses Information and Produces Civil COP
Functional Specialists – Plan, coordinate, facilitate critical stabilization tasks/areas, Engagement Assets
Focus – Provincial Level - Operational-level Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Proposed design ADDS:
- CMOC to each Battalion – Civil Liaison Team
- Standing Planning Team
- Additional Sustainment/Maintenance
HHC 













                                                 
207 LTC Ritchie Moore and LTC Michael Warmack, “Civil Affairs transformation.”.” (PowerPoint, 
March 24, 2005).   
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Supports Unit of Employment Y (UEy) / Corps and/or Joint Task Force
Core of the UEy Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) Capability
CMOC facilitates Civil Engagement / Interagency Coordination / Civil Information Fusion
Civil Liaison Teams – CA Teams for the CMOC, ‘Store front’, Engagement Assets
Civil Information Management Cell – Collates/ fuses Information and Produces Civil COP
Functional Specialists – Plan, coordinate, facilitate critical stabilization tasks/areas, Engagement Assets
Focus – National Level - Operational to Strategic-level Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Proposed design ADDS:
- CMOC to each Brigade – Two (2) Civil Liaison Teams





D. CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND 
 
Civil Affairs Command
Supports Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) / Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC)
CMOC - Facilitates Civil Engagement / Interagency Coordination / Civil Information Fusion
Civil Liaison Teams – ‘Store front’, Engagement Assets to Coordinate Theater-level Resources
Civil Information Management Cell – Collates/ fuses Information and Produces Civil COP
Functional Specialists – Plan, coordinate, facilitate critical reconstruction tasks, Flexible Engagement 
Asset
Focus – Theater Level - Strategic-level Reconstruction and Development 
Proposed design ADDS:
- CMOC to each CACOM – Two (2) Civil Liaison Teams
- Five (5) Standing Planning Teams – ‘Farmed out’ for increased planning capability


















APPENDIX L: CIVIL INFORMATION AND THE COP 
According to the Army Campaign Plan, “The Soldier is the Army’s best 
sensor…to receive and process information” because soldiers come into contact with 
relevant information throughout the area of operations in many unconventional ways.  In 
the course of their normal duties, soldiers gather information through a variety of non-
military people, in different civilian settings and locations, and at specific, non-military, 
events.   
Civil Affairs soldiers have been doing this for years, but for stabilization and 
reconstruction purposes – not for direct action. The method used to organize civil 
information is PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Security, Infrastructure, and 
Information) or ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Organization, People, and Events).  This 
process is called civil information management and helps develop the civil common 
operating picture (COP) for the commander.  At the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels, one of CMOC’s core capabilities is civil information management. 
A. WHAT IS CIVIL INFORMATION 
Civil information is “information developed from data with relation to civil areas, 
structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the 
commander’s … environment that can be fused or processed to increase DoD, 
interagency…. situational awareness understanding or dominance.”208  In other words, 
civil information includes ethnography, structural topography, and social networks.  Civil 
information is not combat intelligence or actionable intelligence. 
B. ASCOPE METHODOLOGY FROM FM 3-05.40 
• Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s operational 
environment that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider 
key civil areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission. CA 
planners analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the 
military mission and how do military operations impact on civilian activities in these  
 
                                                 
208 Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 
2006), Glossary 9. 
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areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major 
portions of the course of actions being considered.  
 
• Structures are existing civil structures that take on many significant roles. Some, such as 
bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are traditional HPTs. Others, 
such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are cultural sites that are 
generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities 
with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio 
stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes. Structures analysis 
involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of 
military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from 
civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational 
implications; the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs.  
 
• Civil capabilities can be viewed from several perspectives. The term capabilities may 
refer to existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public 
administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.  
Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities, 
public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.  Resources and services 
that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry 
services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the host nation, or other 
nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities 
include resources that may be taken and used by military forces consistent with 
international law.  
 
• Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is normally conducted based on the 14 CA 
functional specialties. The analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and 
organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, CAO/CMO planners consider how 
to address shortfalls, as well as how to capitalize on strengths in capabilities.  
 
• Civil organizations are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with 
government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or 
service organizations, and community watch groups. They might be IGOs or the NGO 
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community. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of 
ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of the populace. They 
can also form the nucleus of humanitarian assistance programs, interim-governing bodies, 
civil defense efforts, and other activities.  
 
• People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, negative, or no impact on 
military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term people includes civilians or 
nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside 
the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In 
all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with 
civilians of all types. When analyzing people, CA Soldiers consider historical, cultural, 
ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. They also identify the key 
communicators and the formal and informal processes used to influence people. 209 
C. COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (COP) 
While civil information should always remain unclassified and reside on 
unclassified networks, it should always be integrated into the commander’s full COP that 
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APPENDIX M:  CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMON SKILLS  
A. CIVIL AFFAIRS SKILLS210  
Here is the complete list and description of Civil Affairs common skills found in 
FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations:  
• Warrior. Able to perform as a member of a combat operation using both 
individual and squad movement techniques (mounted and dismounted) and 
executing live-fire defensive protective measures with common weapon systems.  
Skilled in basic combative techniques and force protection (FP) measures. 
• Communications. Able to perform routine short and long-range (secured and 
unsecured) communications, including message formatting, encryption, and 
decryption. 
• Civil Information Management (CIM). Able to perform using automation 
devices to conduct civil reconnaissance for the CIM process that can be 
partitioned from traditional military intelligence systems while maintaining the 
capability to geo-reference and interface pertinent civil and threat data to assist in 
developing the civil inputs to the common operational picture (COP) of the 
operational area, and establishing and maintaining a situation map.  Familiar with 
common Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operational terms, graphics 
and symbols, and determining civil, military, and environmental threat 
identification and classification. 
• Field craft and Survival. Able to perform evading and surviving in all 
environmental conditions using field craft techniques, and conventional and 
unconventional survival procedures.  
• Land Navigation. Able to navigate in all environments over short and long 
distances individually or in groups, mounted and dismounted using advanced 
positioning devices, orienteering techniques, map and compass, and terrain 
association to accurately arrive at a destination. 
• Medical. Able to administer immediate combat medical life-saving treatment to a 
wounded or distressed individual in preparation for emergency evacuation. 
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• Methods of Instruction. Able to deliver performance-oriented training to teach 
civil/military subjects. 
• Language. Able to communicate in the soldier’s assigned foreign language and 
may have limited ability to express themselves within the context of the customs, 
traditions, and mores of a specific culture or mix of cultures endemic to the area 
of responsibility (AOR). 
• Regional Focus and Cultural Awareness. Knowledgeable of regional 
geography, political, social, and economic systems.  Familiar with Indigenous 
Population Institution and their specific regional religious and ethnic differences, 
and able to operate within the cultures indigenous to the AOR. 
• Negotiation and Mediation. Able to mediate, negotiate, and facilitate interaction 
across the civil-military spectrum. 
• CA Mission Planning. Able to plan for, execute, and continually assess CAO 
(explain).  Able to advise conventional and unconventional units in CMO. Able 
to conduct CA support mission planning. Able to prepare to transition to CAO. 
• Information Operations. Able to synchronize CAO with information operations 
(IO) objectives.  Able to support the IO plan and integrate indigenous 
information systems and institutions. 
• Project Management. Able to manage projects and programs associated with the 
delivery of effects, including financial management. 
• International Civilian Response. Familiar with the international civilian 
organizations (United Nations [UN], International Committee of the Red Cross 
[ICRC], and so on) mandated with responding to the needs of civilian 
populations (for example, refugees, internally displaced persons [IDPs], and 
other vulnerable persons). 
B. CIVIL AFFAIRS CHARACTERISTICS:211  
• Responsiveness. To be truly responsive to the needs of the Army, CA forces 
must be deployable and capable of quickly and effectively engaging the civil 
component of the AOR. The primary means that the CA force uses to coordinate 
actions and engage the civil component is CMOC, CLTs, and CATs. 
Additionally, some CA forces are capable of airborne, or air assault, insertion.  
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CA units ensure a shared COP with key nonorganic resources to exploit mutual 
strengths, and to reduce and protect vulnerabilities.  CA units are capable of 
independent operations for a minimum of three days regardless of the operational 
tempo (OPTEMPO).  Because CA units must remain responsive to the needs of 
joint, coalition, OGAs, interagency, conventional forces, SOF, IGOs, and NGOs, 
they possess robust communications capability.  CA units are outfitted with the 
latest military secure and nonsecure voice and digital communications equipment 
so that they have reachback capability regardless of assignment to CA specialists, 
IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs throughout the AOR. 
• Agility. CA leaders are schooled in military art and science, doctrine,  regional 
and cultural awareness, and are adept at troops leading in dynamic, fluid 
operational environments.  This agility allows the CA leader to leverage military 
and civil resources to achieve U.S. and coalition force objectives. The CA/CMO 
command and control (C2) systems are optimized for mission accomplishment 
and allow the civil elements of the COP to be updated continuously and shared 
across the force.  Agility, also, allows the CA unit to share nontactical 
information with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs outside the force, while 
facilitating rapid CMO decision making. 
• Versatility. CA units have the inherent capability to conduct decisive CAO in 
support of CMO in all conditions synchronized with Army and joint fires, 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting acquisition (RSTA) and nonorganic 
assets.  Although CA battalions are organized for maximum operability and 
effectiveness, to include embedded CMOC and CLT organizations, they may be 
adapted to changes in mission. 
• Lethality. CA forces support lethality by providing commanders with civil 
information to increase their situational awareness and understanding to achieve 
full spectrum dominance. 
• CA forces do this through civil reconnaissance (CR) and nonlethal targeting to 
shape the battlefield, inform the lethal targeting process, and to mitigate civilian 
interference and collateral damage resulting from lethal targeting. 
• Survivability. CA commanders must attempt to accomplish a mission with 
minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating FP 
considerations into all aspects of CAO.  CA units must take advantage of all 
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available technologies that provide maximum protection at the soldier level. 
Further, CA soldiers gain significant survivability advantages through the 
development of rapport with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs who recognize that 
their success is tied to the ability of CA soldiers to operate in the AO.  
Survivability is achieved through situational awareness, force design, and 
collective training. 
• Sustainability. CA units rely on technology to provide reach back (secure, 
nonsecure, voice, and digital), access to supplies, local nation supply 
procurement, and assistance of OGAs, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs for civil assistance 
support.  CA forces support mission sustainability by planning and conducting 
CAO/CMO through, by, and with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, HN, and OGAs.  This 
support involves providing assistance, coordination, and training to facilitate 
complete transition of CAO/CMO to IPI, IGOs, NGOs, HN, and OGA 
authorities.  This type of CA support provides continuity and sustainability of 
CMO and, ultimately, the success of national objectives in a joint operations area 
(JOA/AOR). 
• Trainability. CA forces must train and maintain the highest levels of readiness.  
CA leaders must be able to train their units without significant external support, 
be adaptive, and be able to learn and train during operations. 
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